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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
FUNDING DEFINED BENEFIT STATE PENSION PLANS: 
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION 
 
Defined Benefit (DB) state pension trust funds are an integral component of state 
finances and play a major role in the country’s labor and capital markets. The last 
decade though has seen a substantial growth in unfunded pension obligations and a 
seeming inability by states to make the contributions needed to cover funding shortfalls. 
When coupled with even larger unfunded retirement health benefits, the looming 
threat of insolvent state retirement systems pose both current and long-term fiscal 
challenges to state governments already struggling with the ongoing economic 
downturn and billions of dollars in budget deficits. The convergence of these factors 
have led states to undertake various reform strategies in an attempt to move their 
respective public pension plans towards a more sustainable funding path.   
 
Using an asset-liability framework to describe the DB plan funding structure and 
process, this dissertation advances the discussion over major pension reform efforts 
currently implemented or considered by states. I show analytically the link between 
various pension reform categories and specific DB plan funding components, and how 
this in turn, affects DB plan funding outcomes. From this analytical framework, I derive 
the study’s hypotheses on the relationship between DB plan reform-linked funding 
components and outcomes of interest.  
 
This study looks at three DB-plan reform-linked funding components: (1) plan member 
employee contributions, (2) plan employer contributions, and (3) retirement benefit 
payments. Four major funding outcomes are evaluated: (1) the employer contribution 
rate, (2) flow funding ratio, and (3) stock funding ratio, and (4) relative size of plan 
unfunded liability.  
 
Utilizing a unique panel dataset of 100 DB state retirement systems from 50 states 
covering a nine-year period of FY 2002 to 2010, I empirically test the following 
hypothesized funding relationships: (1) States as DB plan sponsors have underfunded 
their plans as indicated by their failure to meet annual employer funding requirements; 
 
 
and (2) Increasing the employee and employer contribution rate and reducing the cost 
of retirement benefits are associated with higher plan stock funding ratios and lower 
unfunded pension liabilities. 
 
Results from my fixed-effects (FE) panel regression analyses provide the clearest 
empirical evidence to date that state DB pension plan sponsors underfunded their 
required annual employer contributions. The financial condition of a state’s budget is 
also shown to have a significant effect on the amount states are able to contribute into 
their pension funds. I find empirical support for the crucial function of employer 
contributions in determining the overall funded status of state pension plans. This 
finding is further reinforced when I estimate plan stock funding ratios using a dynamic 
system GMM (sGMM) panel regression model. The results from static FE and dynamic 
sGMM models suggest no significant effect on overall plan funding levels from changes 
in the employee contribution rate or the average retirement benefit cost. Lastly, the 
results lend evidence to the significant influence of past funding levels on current 
funding levels. It is recommended that future empirical research account for the 
dynamic nature of public pension funding and related endogeneity issues. This 
dissertation concludes by discussing the implications of the empirical findings for policy 
makers seeking to improve the funded status of their respective state DB retirement 
systems. 
 
KEYWORDS: Public Pensions, State Retirement Systems, Defined Benefit,  
                       Pension Reform, Dynamic Empirical Model 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview of Public Employee Retirement Systems 
This study evaluates the funding of state retirement systems over the period of 
Fiscal Years (FY) 2002 to 2008.  As part of my evaluation, I present a framework for 
relating employer contribution behavior to the funding process of a typical Defined 
Benefit (DB) public pension plan. I discuss the results of my research within the context 
of its implications for selected policy reforms intended to improve the overall funded 
status of state retirement systems. 
While administered separately in a fiduciary capacity from the primary government 
budget, public employee pension trust funds are an integral component of state 
finances, and as a sector, play a major role in the country’s labor and capital markets 
(Peng, 2008). In FY 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated there were 3,418 public 
employee retirement systems (PERS), of which 222 were administered at the state level 
(Becker-Medina, 2012).1  Although the number of state pension plans represents only 6 
percent of all public pension plans, these state administered retirement systems cover 
90 percent of all public sector employee members and 84 percent of retirees and 
beneficiaries.2  
Cash and investment holdings of state pension plans, which in FY 2010 totaled $2.2 
trillion, historically account for over 80 percent of all assets held by public retirement 
systems (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012; see also Figure 1-1). To put the size of these asset 
holdings into perspective – consider that 19 out of the 25 largest U.S. retirement 
systems in 2010 were state pension plans. The California Public Employee Retirement 
                                                     
1 In this study, the terms and acronyms of public pension plans, public employee retirement 
systems (PERS), and state and local government (SLG) retirement systems, are all equivalent and 
used interchangeably throughout the text. 
2 The U.S. Census Bureau (2012) estimated in FY 2010 that out of the total 14.7 million active 
members in US public retirement systems, nearly 13 million were in state retirement systems. 
During the same period, state plans covered almost 7 million of the 8.2 million total public 
employee retirees and their beneficiaries. 
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System (CalPERS) is the largest state DB pension plan with assets valued in 2010 at over 
$ 214 billion (see Table 1-1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Total Annual Assets, Benefit Payments, Active and Retired Membership, All 
State Retirement Systems, FY 2002-2010 (Source: U.S. Census Bureau) 
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Table 1-1. Largest U.S. Pension Plans in 2010, Ranked by Total Assets (in $U.S. million) 
 
Note: DB-Defined Benefit; DC-Defined Contribution.  Source: Pensions and Investments 
(February 7, 2011). "2011 P&I Top 1000 Largest Retirement Plans". Accessed March 2011 from 
www.pionline.com 
 
 
 
As highlighted in later chapters, these substantial pension fund investments in 
financial markets result in public pension plan revenues being highly dependent on 
market performance. 
When combined with local government retirement plans, the economic 
contributions of public pension plans are not only gauged by the trillion dollars invested 
annually in the stock market, but also by the pension benefits paid out to retired public 
employees and their beneficiaries.  In FY 2010, public pensions disbursed over $200 
billion in retirement annuities, of which 81 percent or $ 164 billion was paid out by state 
plans to 7 million retirees and their beneficiaries (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). These 
pension benefits, which grew by 85 percent from FY 2002-FY 2010 due to the steadily 
stocks bonds cash other
1 Fed Retirement Thrift 264,013 264,013 ---
2 CalPERS 214,387 213,066 1,321 52% 24% 2% 23%
3 CalSTRS 138,888 138,630 258 53% 23% 24%
4 NY State Common 133,023 133,023 --- 55% 26% 1% 18%
5 Florida State Board 123,373 117,802 5,571 61% 25% 1% 13%
6 NY City Retirement 115,204 96,801 18,403 59% 34% 0.1% 8%
7 General Motors 101,541 87,807 13,734 27% 46% --- 27%
8 Texas Teachers 100,280 100,280 --- 56% 22% 1% 21%
9 IBM 83,095 49,692 33,403 35% 47% 0% 17%
10 NY State Teachers 80,324 80,324 --- 61% 23% 1% 15%
11 Boeing 79,411 48,670 30,741 34% 51% --- 15%
12 WI Investment Board 77,812 75,355 2,457 59% 27% --- 14%
13 AT&T 76,183 46,090 30,093 41% 33% 1% 25%
14 North Carolina 75,314 69,746 5,568 50% 38% --- 12%
15 OH Public Employees 72,157 71,727 430 62% 27% 0.3% 11%
16 New Jersey 70,803 70,230 573 44% 37% 3% 16%
17 WA State Board 61,637 52,035 9,602 37% 21% 1% 41%
18 Ohio State Teachers 61,007 60,587 420 65% 18% 3% 14%
19 General Electric 60,843 42,728 18,115 49% 20% 4% 27%
20 OR Public Employees 55,216 54,152 1,064 44% 26% --- 30%
DB Asset Allocation
Rank Plan Sponsor Assets Total DB Total DC 
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growing number of retirees, are critical for the welfare of public employees and help 
create economic multiplier effects for state and local economies (Boivie & Almeida, 
2009; see also Figure 1-1). 
Retirement income comprises a greater share of public employees’ overall 
compensation compared to their private sector counterparts, and as such, offering 
retirement benefits that are either competitive or generous relative to the private 
sector, helps the public sector meet its workforce goals in recruiting, hiring, and 
retaining skilled and qualified workers (Bender & Heywood, 2010; Franzel, 2009). In 
particular, guaranteed and statutorily protected DB retirement benefits are highly 
valued and preferred by public employees, and continue to be the dominant type of 
pension plan in the public sector covering over 90 percent of state and local government 
employees (Munnell et al. 2007, 2008b, 2011b). As a result, DB pension plans have been 
an effective recruitment and retention tool in the public sector (Almeida & Boivie, 
2009). Nonetheless, rapidly growing retirement benefit obligations have begun to exert 
increasing fiscal pressure on states as concerns grow over the current and long-term 
solvency of state run DB retirement systems (GAO 2010b, 2012a, and 2012b; Russek, 
2011).  
The Issue of Unfunded Public Pension Liabilities 
In a series of widely cited reports, estimates from The Pew Center on the States 
(2007, 2010a, 2011, 2012) indicate that between FY 2006 to FY 2010, pension liabilities 
grew by 30 percent from $2.35 trillion to $3.07 trillion while plan assets only rose 16 
percent from $1.9 trillion to $2.3 trillion. With the increase in liabilities outpacing asset 
holdings, the funding gap grew from $361 billion in FY 2006 to $757 billion by the end of 
FY 2010, representing a 110 percent increase in unfunded pension liabilities. Over this 
same period, actuarially determined annual employer contributions that state and local 
governments (SLGs) needed to make in order to cover funding shortfalls and maintain 
solvency in their respective retirement systems, rose 50 percent from $48.8 billion to 
$73.7 billion. The problem was that state and local governments were contributing on 
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average, 17 percent less than the required annual total, thus worsening the funding gap 
even further.3 The failure by states to meet their required annual pension contributions 
is understandable if we consider that states were facing an estimated $230 billion in 
budget shortfalls and one of the worst fiscal periods in decades due to the economic 
downturn and slow recovery (see NASBO 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).  
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011a, 2011b) present an even more dismal assessment of 
public retirement system funding by reporting even larger estimates than that given by 
the Pew Center on the aggregate pension liability. They argue that the discount rates 
used by states, typically around 8 percent, is problematic since it does not realistically 
reflect the risk of the retirement benefit payments from a taxpayer point of view under 
different conditions.  At a minimum, Novy-Marx and Rauh estimate that the combined 
total liabilities for state pension plans is anywhere from $3.2 trillion if discounting 
according to the taxable state-specific municipal yield curve, to $4.4 trillion if using the 
discount rate given by the Treasury yield curve. When the actuarial procedure of 
recognizing future service and wage increases is used, the liability estimate goes up to 
$5.2 trillion.4 
The Impetus for Reform 
The funded status of public employee retirement systems is a major public policy 
and finance issue largely due to the huge investment losses racked up from two financial 
crises within the past decade, along with looming increases in the annual total cost of 
benefit payments as baby boomers begin to retire in large numbers soon. The 
uneasiness over public pension funding is further heightened when considered in the 
context of current and growing long-term fiscal challenges faced by states. As the 
funding outlook deteriorates for state retirement systems coupled with its looming 
                                                     
3 Author’s calculations using Pew Center on the States aggregate state level data on actual and 
required employer contributions.  
4 In a series of papers, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009, 2011a, 2011b) comprehensively examine the 
issue over the appropriate discount rate for public pensions. For a more summarized overview 
of the debate, see GAO (2012a, pp. 45-47). 
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adverse fiscal implications, an increasing number of states are undertaking efforts to 
reform various aspects of their respective DB pension plans (Mitchell, 2011; Munnell et 
al., 2011c; GAO, 2012).  
Anecdotal evidence of the growing impetus for reforms is noted in GAO (2012a) and 
The Pew Center on the States (2010a, 2012) which highlight the increasing amount of 
pension reform legislation passed in recent years. In reviewing annual pension related 
legislation compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Pew Center 
reported more pension reform legislation was passed in 2010 compared to the two 
previous years combined, and the trend towards more reform continued through FY 
2011 and FY 2012 (NCSL; see Snell, 2003-2010; The Pew Center, 2010a; see also Table 1-
2). They also found that apart from the reforms related to benefit reductions and 
contribution increases, more than a third of the states created task forces or 
commissions to study and explore various solutions and policy initiatives. As part of 
their review, The Pew Center identified five broad categories of policy reforms for state 
pension plans (Pew Center 2010a, p. 8), these were: 
1. Keeping up with funding requirements; 
2. Increasing employee contributions; 
3. Reducing benefits; 
4. Improving governance and investment oversight; and 
5. Increasing employee share of the investment risk.  
 
A direct empirical examination of each reform category may not be feasible due to 
the lack of data, and as most reforms are just recently implemented. An alternative for 
policymakers is to have a framework by which to evaluate the rationale and outcomes 
for each reform category. While such a framework is currently lacking in the public 
pension literature, it would center on the premise that all reforms have the general 
objective of improving the overall funded status of their respective retirement systems. 
Furthermore, despite the different reform categories, the saliency of these reforms 
reflects the fiduciary role that state governments have in ensuring their respective DB 
plans are adequately funded. Hence, by design, the state government as plan sponsor is 
ultimately responsible for covering any pension funding shortfalls through employer 
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contributions. This raises the question as to what determines the rate at which states 
make their actual employer contributions, and to what degree they meet their 
actuarially determined annual required contributions (ARC).  Addressing these questions 
empirically allow us to test the hypothesis that DB state plans are underfunded largely 
because states were remiss in fully meeting their annual contribution obligations. 
 
 
 
Table 1-2. Selected Pension Policy Reforms Enacted by State Legislatures, 2003-2010 
TYPE OF 
REFORM 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Increase 
employer 
contributions 
CO, 
CT, FL, 
KS, 
NM, 
NC, 
OR 
AZ, 
KS, LA, 
MS, 
NE, 
OK, 
PA, RI 
AZ, 
MN, 
MT, 
NM, 
SC, TX, 
WA, 
WY 
AK, AZ, 
CO, CT, 
IL, IA, 
KY, MN, 
NE, NM, 
WA, WV 
CT, MT, 
NE, NJ, 
ND, OK, 
TX 
AK, 
CT, IA, 
VT, 
WA, 
WV 
NE, 
NM, 
OK 
CA, FL, 
IL, IA, 
MN, 
NM, WY 
Increase 
employee 
contributions 
FL, 
NE, 
OK 
AZ, 
NE, 
OK 
IA, LA, 
MN, 
NE, 
NM, 
SC, WA 
FL, IA, 
KY, MN, 
NE, WA 
NJ AK, IA, 
NH, 
NM, 
VT 
AZ, 
KY, 
NE, 
UT, 
WY, 
TX 
CO, IA, 
LA, MN, 
MS, 
MO, 
NM, VT, 
WY 
Reduce 
future 
benefits 
LA KY, LA, 
SD, WI 
KY, OK CO, IL, 
IA, LA, 
MN, WY 
CA, CT, 
HI, KY, 
MS, MO, 
NH, ND 
CT, 
NH, 
NJ, 
NY, VT 
GA, 
LA, 
NV, 
RI, TX 
AZ, CA, 
CO, IL, 
IA, LA, 
MI, MN, 
MS, NJ, 
VT, VA 
Introduced 
DC or Hybrid 
Plan 
 OR, CO, AK   GA  UT, MI 
Approved 
POBs/GO 
Bonds; OPEB 
pre-funding 
(2007 only) 
CA, IL, 
OR, 
WI 
      AL, DE, 
GA, IA, 
LA, MD, 
MO, NV, 
TN, UT, 
VT, VA, 
WV 
AK IL   
Note: Partial list only; a more detailed and comprehensive information of state legislature 
enacted pension policies can be accessed from the NCSL website as compiled by Ronald Snell 
at http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13399.   
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Despite the prevalence of articles on public pension underfunding, much of the 
empirical evidence is limited to descriptive estimates of the aggregate difference 
between total plan assets and total liabilities. Even more common is research relating 
overall funding levels and investment performance to governance practices (see for 
example, Albrecht & Lynch, 2007; Hess, 2005; Schneider, 2005; Schneider & 
Damanpour, 2002). Studies that do examine public pension employer contributions 
emphasized state fiscal condition as a primary predictor of state funding effort (e.g., 
Eaton & Nofsinger, 2004; Munnell et al., 2008d).  
This dissertation builds on the existing empirical pension funding literature by 
constructing a framework by which to link the various pension reform categories to 
specific DB plan funding components. The framework applies a balance sheet-like 
approach to describe the state DB funding structure and process. With this framework, I 
derive hypotheses on the funding relationships between the reform-linked DB plan 
funding components and DB plan funding outcomes of interest. Specifically, the asset-
liability framework is used to evaluate the hypothesis that increasing employer and 
employee contributions and reducing the annual cost of retirement benefit payments 
improves a plan’s overall funded status.   
Using a unique panel dataset of 100 state administered DB pension plans from FY 
2002-2010, I empirically test my hypotheses with static Fixed Effects (FE) and dynamic 
GMM panel regression models. I find evidence that state DB plan sponsors underfunded 
their annual required employer contributions, and that employer contributions play a 
critical role in determining the overall plan funded status.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter, I review the 
five major pension reform categories identified by the Pew Center (2010b) by 
presenting the rationale and providing examples for each reform category. In Chapter 3, 
I present the asset-liability framework used in this study to describe the DB plan funding 
structure and process, and evaluate the relationship between the reform-linked DB plan 
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funding components and improved DB plan funding outcomes. I outline my data and 
research methods in Chapter 4 and discuss the results of my empirical analysis in 
Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I extend the static empirical model from Chapter 5 by taking 
into account the dynamic adjustments in public pension funding. I report and discuss 
the results of a dynamic GMM panel regression model of plan stock funding ratios. In 
the last chapter, I summarize my findings, discuss future research prospects, and 
conclude by discussing the implications of my results in the context of efforts to reform 
public pensions given the current fiscal conditions of states.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
SELECTED POLICY REFORMS TO IMPROVE STATE DB PENSION 
FUNDING OUTCOMES 
 
In the introductory chapter, I highlighted the dismal and worsening financial outlook 
of DB state retirement systems and the saliency of these funding problems considering 
the significant role of public pension plans in the country’s financial and labor markets. 
States have increasingly moved to consider and implement reforms to improve the 
funded status of their respective pension plans. As cited in the last chapter, The Pew 
Center on the States (2010a) identified five major areas  where states are either 
considering or implementing reforms to address funding shortfalls, control the growth 
in liabilities, and restore their retirement systems on the path towards long-term 
solvency. In this chapter, I discuss the rationale behind the reforms and provide 
examples in each of the reform categories. 
Keeping Up With Funding Requirements 
As a policy reform strategy, tackling employer contributions involves assessing the 
plan sponsor’s pension funding behavior. Unlike employee contributions, which are 
fixed by statute, employer contribution rates vary yearly depending on the actuary’s 
assessment of a plan’s funded status for a given period (Peng, 2008). Actual employer 
contributions are evaluated relative to the actuarially determined annual required 
contribution (ARC). This measure is normally expressed as a percentage of the plan’s 
annual covered payroll (ACP) in nominal dollars.  The ARC is equal to the amount 
needed to cover the value of employee services accrued in the current year and an 
amortization of any unfunded accrued actuarial liability. 
Because states can choose to pay more or less than their ARC, the extent to which 
states meet their actuarially required contributions reflects both plan funding health 
and the plan sponsor’s funding effort from a fiscal standpoint (GAO, 2008; Munnell et 
al., 2008d; Young, 2009).  
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The plan’s ARC incorporates all the actuarial information including the costing 
methods and assumptions in measuring the plan’s overall funded status and the funding 
requirement or target that the plan sponsor needs to contribute to maintain a desired 
funding outcome. Paying the full ARC every year signals that the state has set aside 
sufficient funds to cover currently accruing benefits and to pay down unfunded accrued 
benefits carried over from previous years. A failure to make the full ARC payment may 
reflect a variety of conditions that include the following:  
 
(1) The state government is currently in a weak fiscal position to fully pay the 
required amount. 
(2) The state government is either constrained or legally bound from paying the full 
ARC due to its funding policy. The most common funding policy requires 
employer contributions to be determined actuarially and for the full actuarial 
amount to be paid every year.  Peng (2008) identified 34 states that adopted this 
policy but noted that it did not necessarily guarantee that the full actuarial 
amount was paid. States such as Alaska, Kansas, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, 
have actuarially determined employer contribution rates but their actual 
employer contribution is ultimately subject to various legal provisions such as 
caps on the rate of increase or legislative approval.   
(3) Other states follow a funding policy based on a statutory contribution rate 
(Munnell et al., 2008d). States may adopt this funding policy for two reasons 
(Peng, 2008; p. 102): (1) to stabilize contribution rates over time rather than face 
an actuarial rate that fluctuates according to changes in plan funding; or (2) to 
correct for severe underfunding caused by historically low employer contribution 
rates. The latter reason involves raising the statutory contribution rate to bring 
the plan to a desired level of funding over a certain period. In order to mitigate 
shocks to the state budget, a gradual rate increase schedule is normally used to 
raise the contribution rate to the targeted actuarial rate.  
(4) When a state contributes far and above its required employer contribution rate 
or what it contributes historically, it is attributed to either a one-time General 
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Fund appropriation or government borrowing. Issuing pension obligation bonds 
(POBs) and using the proceeds to pay off unfunded pension liabilities in one 
lump can be an attractive policy option for states that have severely 
underfunded retirement systems. Thomson Reuters Financial estimates state 
and local governments from 26 states issued a total of 340 POBs between 1993 
and 2006 (Davis, 2006). Research on the use of POBs has yielded mixed results, 
and many of the case studies were limited to underscoring the poor design and 
mismanagement of POB issuances in the past (Burnham, 2003; McDonald & 
Cataldo, 2008; Peng, 2004; Williams, 2002).   
 
Using cross-sectional data on 126 DB state and local pension plans from 2006, 
Munnell et al. (2008b) found that two-thirds of public plan employers fail to pay the full 
ARC due to legal constraints. They also identified lack of funding discipline, governance 
issues, and fiscal characteristics as other factors that affect ARC payment. 
The NCSL compilation of 2010 state pension legislation shows at least seven states 
that enacted changes to their state DB plan employer contributions during the recent 
legislative cycle (Snell, 2010).  Some of the changes involved direct increases in the 
employer contribution rate. For example, Iowa enacted concurrent increases in 
employer and employee contribution rates for its Peace Officer Retirement System and 
Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS). In 2010, states such as New Mexico and 
New York issued provisions to either delay contribution rate increases or introduce new 
amortization schedules for selected DB plans. Over the same period, differing funding 
policies were also implemented. For example, Rhode Island removed a statutory 
obligation of making certain payments to its state employee and teacher retirement 
systems whereas the Vermont legislature passed a law requiring full funding of its 
annual actuarial employer contribution requirement. 
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Increasing Employee Contributions 
Unlike their private sector DB counterparts, public sector employees are required to 
contribute a percentage of their annual salaries to their respective DB plans (Munnell et 
al., 2007). On average, employee contributions are fixed at a lower rate than employer 
contributions but as fiscal pressures mount along with increasing employer contribution 
requirements, states are now looking towards their workers to pay a larger share in 
order to improve funding outcomes (Pew Center, 2010a, 2010b). Since 2008, half the 
states have enacted increases in member contributions (GAO, 2012a). In the 2010 
legislative cycle alone, nine states enacted employee contribution rate increases 
compared to only five states in 2008 and 2009 respectively (Snell, 2008, 2009, 2010).    A 
review of NCSL compiled pension legislation passed in 2010 showed that the kind and 
scope of legislated increases in employee contribution rates varied by state. For 
example, Minnesota enacted increases in employee contribution rates across the board 
for its general, public safety, and teacher employee members. In another example, 
Missouri introduced new contributory tiers for new members of the Missouri 
Department of Transportation and Highway Patrol Employees' Retirement System 
(MPERS), the Missouri State Employees’ Retirement System and the retirement plan for 
judges. In their plan, employees hired after January 1, 2011 would make a pre-tax 
employee contribution of 4 percent of salary. Up until this legislation, Missouri plans 
were non-contributory.   
Other states passed legislation that implements annual increases of the employee 
contribution rate over a specified period. For example, New Mexico enacted a 0.225% 
increase over a four-year period from 2005 to 2008 for members of its New Mexico 
Educational Retirement Fund; this started on July 1, 2005 at 7.675% of salary and 
increased to 7.9% of salary by July 1, 2008 (Snell, 2005). 
Reducing Benefits 
In this approach to reforming pensions, reducing the level of employee benefits 
improves plan funding by reducing the actuarial value of plan liabilities and 
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correspondingly the funding requirements. In practice though, states can only reduce or 
change the benefits for newly hired and future employees (GAO, 2010). This is because 
all states have strong legal protections for their pensions, either by constitutional 
provision or statute, that prevent benefits accrued by existing employees from being 
eliminated or diminished (Kaufman, 2007; Moore et al., 2000).  
All the same, states are actively implementing changes to their respective defined 
benefit systems. A review of state pension plan enactments compiled by the NCSL from 
the 2010 legislative cycle reveals that twelve states reduced benefits for new employees 
in their defined benefit plans (Snell, 2010). Benefits were reduced through a variety of 
means that included adjusting the pension benefit formula and raising eligibility 
requirements such as increasing the retirement age (GAO, 2012a). For example, 
retirement multipliers were lowered for new employees of CalPERS and four of 
Louisiana’s state DB plans. In Mississippi and New Jersey, provisions for longer service 
requirements were made. In Minnesota, the early retirement reduction factor was 
increased for newly hired members of its State Patrol Retirement Plan. In effect, the 
retirement annuity is reduced by a certain factor upon early retirement for each year 
that a person is short of normal retirement age. Another way states carry out benefit 
reductions is through increasing the number of years used in the final average salary 
(FAS) formula. For example, Iowa recently passed a law requiring the retirement 
benefits for new IPERS members to be calculated using five years of a member’s highest 
salary instead of the current three years (Snell, 2010). 
Post-retirement cost of living adjustments (COLAs) are another type of benefit 
enhancement that states are also trying to reform. Unlike their private sector DB 
counterparts, most DB public pension plans offer COLAs to reduce the impact of 
inflation on retirement benefits, a feature virtually unheard of in the private sector 
(Munnell & Soto, 2007). Depending on the plan, COLAs are either automatically based 
on a fixed rate or some percentage of the Consumer Price Index or awarded ad hoc at 
the discretion of the plan’s governing body (Harris, 2002).  The 2010 NCSL compilation 
of pension reform legislation identified eight states that dealt with inflation indexation 
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of retirement annuities (Snell, 2010). States such as Minnesota and South Dakota 
enacted provisional reductions in the COLA of retirement benefits contingent on the 
improvement of plan funding ratios. Other states such as Colorado extended the period 
after retirement before COLAs are allowed to kick-in whereas states such as Illinois 
removed the compounding feature for such provisions.  
Whatever policy reform states undertake to reduce employee retirement benefits, 
states can expect to face legal challenges from their respective retirement system 
members and public employee unions (Moran, 2010). For example, Colorado and 
Minnesota which recently enacted reductions in member COLAs are now facing legal 
suits claiming that the reduction in benefits were a violation of contract (Snell, 2010).   
As a whole, because the majority of policy reforms undertaken by states to reduce 
retirement benefits are limited to new and future employees, this approach to 
reforming pensions may not have a considerable impact in reducing the existing 
unfunded DB plan liabilities.  At best, the empirical evidence suggests these reforms 
probably serve only to lessen the rate of plan funding deterioration. In calculating the 
financial impact of various benefit reduction strategies,  Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011a) 
estimate that early retirement practices reduce liabilities by only 2 to 5 percentage 
points, 2 to 4 percentage points if retirement age is increased by one year. They 
calculate that reducing COLAs by 1 percentage point lowers liabilities by only 9 to 11 
percent; and even if COLAs were eliminated altogether, they find that the aggregate 
unfunded liability would still reach around $1.5 trillion.5   
Improving Governance and Investment Oversight 
These types of reforms address how plan administration and board composition 
affect investment policies intended to improve plan investment returns and overall 
portfolio risk. Other issues associated with this policy area include the use of 
                                                     
5 In their simulations, the authors assume a baseline level of three trillion dollar in unfunded 
liabilities (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011a). 
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economically targeted investment (ETI) strategies; the application of ethical practices, 
reporting transparency; and “prudent investor” rules.  
The relationship between plan governance and investment performance is one of 
the more relevant topics covered in the public pension literature mainly because 
investment income comprises the largest share of public pension plan revenues.6 Data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of State and Local Government Retirement 
Systems showed that from 2002 to 2010, half the average annual total revenues of U.S. 
public pension plans came from investment earnings (see Figure 2-1).  The remaining 
portion of plan revenues came from employer contributions and employee 
contributions with an average share of 33 percent and 17 percent respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Total Annual Revenues for U.S. Public Employee Retirement Systems, by 
Revenue Source, FY 2002-2010 (Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2011) 
 
 
                                                     
6 For a comprehensive review of the literature on PERS investment performance, see Schneider 
(2005). Both Albrecht and Lynch (2006) and Albrecht et al (2007) provide an extensive empirical 
evaluation of both public pension plan governance and financial performance.  
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Governance issues can have a significant influence on DB plan funding outcomes 
because pension boards are directed to make decisions on investments, benefit levels, 
and actuarial assumptions (Coggburn & Reddick, 2006; Hess, 2005; Schneider, 2005).  
The way board size and composition determine decisions on investment policy and 
asset allocation is critical since studies have shown that asset allocation can explain up 
to 90 percent of the variability in the return on assets over time (Brinson et al., 1991; 
Ilkiw, 2003). Even so, the empirical literature on the effect of board size and 
composition on plan funding and investment performance has yielded mixed results 
(Schneider, 2005). Some studies show that a greater proportion of appointed trustees 
increases investment performance (e.g., Hess, 2005) and others find a negative, albeit 
non-significant, relationship (Albrecht & Lynch, 2006).  Others such as Mitchell and Hsin 
(1997) and Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) submit that trustees elected by retired 
members negatively affect plan performance whereas Doyle (2005) contends retiree 
elected trustees have no impact on performance. A balanced board would seem to be 
the ideal arrangement since having a board dominated by one type of trustee (e.g., 
appointed/ex-officio or member elected) is counterproductive because it may prevent 
meaningful input from other trustee groups (Hess, 2005). 
What is clear though is the definitive contribution of investment policy changes to 
the considerable growth of asset holdings in the public pension sector as a whole.  
Studies show that public pension plans with greater equity exposure in their portfolios 
tend to perform better. For example, controlling for differences in risk tolerances 
toward equity across plans, Doyle (2005) showed that plans with “a greater appetite for 
investment risk” (as evidenced by a plan increasing its stock limit policy) exhibited 
higher investment returns.  Doyle argues his finding is consistent with basic finance 
theory on the positive relationship between risk and return and goes on to cite research 
showing the extensive impact of the equities market on public fund investment 
performance.  This partly explains why the strong market performance in the 1990s led 
a growing number of state governments to increase the equity exposure of their plan 
asset portfolios as a way to solve underfunding problems, such that by 1996, the three 
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remaining states that banned equity investments lifted their respective prohibitions 
(Useem & Hess, 2001). By 2000, due to the strong and sustained stock market growth 
during this period, half of all state retirement systems were fully funded (Pew Center, 
2007; Young et al., 2006).  
Unfortunately, the period of impressive gains in equity asset values of public pension 
plans also saw numerous benefit enhancements enacted by state legislatures in the 
form of shortened vesting and service requirements, increased benefit formula 
multipliers, reductions in employer and employee contributions, coupled with abusive 
practices related to boosting employees’ final pay earnings (CanagaRetna, 2004; Pew 
Center, 2010a; Schieber, 2011). A weakening economy that began in 2000 with the 
dot.com bust followed by the attacks of 9/11 saw the S&P 500 fall 16 and 19 percent in 
2001 and 2002, respectively.  With falling asset values and upward pressure on liabilities 
due to the cumulative impact of contribution shortfalls and benefit enhancements 
taking hold, state DB pension plan funding ratios started to decline along with a marked 
growth in unfunded pension liabilities. Because most plans apply multi-year asset 
valuation smoothing, the effect of poor investments returns from the 2001-2002 period 
were still being felt five years later in the funding levels of several state plans (Pew 
Center, 2007).7  
Consecutive years of positive investment returns following the 2001-2002 financial 
crises help fuel a recovery in pension plan assets and overall funding levels steadily 
improved until the market once again collapsed in 2008. Munnell et al. (2008a) 
estimates that between October 2007 and October 2008, the value of equity assets for 
state and local defined benefit plans collectively declined by around $1 trillion.  In 
response to substantial pension plan investment losses, several states are undertaking 
efforts to professionalize their investment oversight that include the use of specialized 
investment bodies separate from the board; selecting board members who have 
                                                     
7 Just as it was after the 2001-2002 stock market downturn, the impact of the 2008-2009 
financial crisis will also be felt over time as most plans continue to apply asset valuation 
smoothing methods in order to minimize contribution rate increases that following such funding 
shortfalls (Munnell et al., 2010). 
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financial investment expertise and experience; and increasing the competitiveness of 
the procurement process and performance review of consulting and investing services 
(Pew Center, 2010).  
Sharing the Risk with Employees 
This reform category centers on state efforts to transition away from DB type plans 
toward defined contribution (DC) and hybrid pension plans. After experiencing severe 
investment losses in 2008, several states have considered revisiting this policy option as 
a way of improving the funded status of their retirement systems (Munnell et al., 2011b; 
Pew Center, 2010a, 2010b).  
DC plans, which are far more prevalent in the private sector, differ from DB plans in 
several ways and some of their basic differences, along with a hybrid example, cash 
balance plans, are listed in Table 2-1. In a DB plan, retirement benefits are calculated 
using a predetermined formula utilizing actuarial evaluations of tenure, retirement age, 
and salary (Hustead, 2001); regular contributions are made by the DB plan sponsor and 
members, and fund assets are held in a trust and managed by professional investors 
(Munnell et al., 2007).  
In contrast to DB plans, DC plans involve participants and/or sponsors making pre-
specified contributions with the employee participant shouldering the risk of their own 
investment decisions (CanagaRetna, 2004). The future benefits received under a DC plan 
is a function of the contribution level and outcomes in the investment choices made by 
the participants (Munnell et al., 2008b). Proponents calling for public DB plans to shift to 
DC systems often cite cost containment, portability, and flexibility as a major benefit 
(CanagaRetna, 2004; Pew Center, 2007; Munnell et al., 2011b).   
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Other pension plans such as Cash Balance, Deferred Compensation, Deferred 
Retirement Option Programs (DROPs), or plans that incorporate a combination of DB 
and DC components, are referred to as hybrid systems.8   
 
 
 
Table 2-1. Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution, and Hybrid Pension Plan 
Characteristics 
  
 Traditional Defined Benefit 
(DB) Plans  
 Defined Contribution (DC) 
Plans  
 Common Hybrid 
Example: Cash 
Balance Plans  
Funding / 
Contributions 
Typically by employer only Employee determines wage 
contribution rate; employer 
may also contribute 
Employer  
Financial Market 
Risk Borne By  
Employer  Employee  Employer  
Benefits 
Determined By  
Formula based on years of 
service and final or highest 
average pay  
Contributions (based on 
current wages) and 
investment returns on 
those contributions  
Pay Credits 
(based on 
current wages 
and interest 
credits)  
Enrollment and 
Vesting 
Eligibility and participation 
are typically automatic. 
Participants may need to 
work up to 10 years for full 
vesting.   
May require waiting for 
eligibility and sign-up by 
employee. May need to 
work up to 6 years to fully 
vest in employer matching 
contributions   
Varies; depends 
on plan sponsor 
arrangement 
How Benefits Are 
Typically Paid at 
Retirement and 
general risk 
associated 
 Typically payable as life 
annuities, but may have 
lump sum option. Annuities 
lose purchasing power if 
not indexed to inflation.   
Lump Sum; typically by 
withdrawing from total 
balances, and must be 
managed to last throughout 
retirement.   
Annuity or Lump 
Sum based on 
account balance 
of each 
participant 
Access to Funds 
for Current 
Workers Prior to 
Retirement  
No  Yes (through loans and 
hardship withdrawals)  
No  
Portability Generally not portable. 
Sometimes unavailable 
until beneficiary reaches 
specified retirement age.   
Portable; can be left in 
plan, rolled over to an IRA, 
or cashed out 
  
Source: Adapted from Gale and Orszag (2003); and GAO (2007) 
                                                     
8 For an overview of the different type of hybrid pension plans, see Coggburn and Reddick (2006, 
pp. 431-435). A more detailed discussion of cash balance plans is found in Rappaport et al 
(1997). 
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For most hybrid plans, the pension sponsor still retains the investment risk but 
reduces it in most cases by guaranteeing a relatively low rate of return associated with 
lower risk investments (Clark & Haley, 2001). In Ohio and Washington, state employees 
can opt to sign for a combined plan in which employer contributions fund a lower but 
guaranteed retirement benefit, while employee contributions are invested separately in 
a defined contribution plan (Pew Center 2007). Oregon adopted a similar hybrid 
approach to pension plan investing in 2003 when it allowed employees to invest in a 
portfolio mirroring that of Oregon’s own DB plan and to date, 70 percent of Oregon’s DC 
assets are invested this way (Olleman, 2007). According to The Pew Center (2007), 
Nebraska took note of Oregon’s cost savings from the hybrid program and decided to 
adopt a cash-balance plan, in which employees and the state both make annual 
contributions and are guaranteed a 5 percent annual return. They found the plan works 
especially well for risk-averse employees who also prefer the convenience of not having 
to make their own investment decisions.  
The differences between DC, hybrid, and DB plans, along with the debate over 
shifting away from DB public plans to address underfunding problems, has been 
extensively covered in the literature.9  Giertz and Papke (2007) argue though that this 
debate has generally emphasized extraneous issues, and when actually directed toward 
underfunding issues, plan type ultimately does not matter because all plans can be 
modified accordingly. From the policymaker’s perspective, the objective essentially is to 
shift the investment risk from the state government or plan sponsor to the plan member 
employee. Other factors that determine whether to pursue a DC and hybrid plans 
related to whether governments can save money by making the transition away from 
DB plans (Munnell et al., 2011b; Frank et al., 2011). One area where cost savings are 
expected from requiring new employees to join DC plans is from lower future DB 
payments as the number of DB plan members begin to diminish upon retirement (Fore 
                                                     
9 For a more comprehensive review of DC/Hybrid public pension plans, see Munnell et al. 
(2011b) and Frank et al. (2011). See also Beshears et al. (2011) for a behavioral economics 
perspective on the adoption of public sector DC and hybrid systems.  
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2001). Nevertheless, the empirical evidence from the few cases where states have 
introduced a DC system is that adopting a DC plan “does nothing to take care of 
unfunded obligations” (Olleman 2007, p. 5). The Pew Center (2007) similarly argued that 
shifting to a DC system does not ensure states will start adequately funding their 
pension plans. Furthermore, the transition away from a DB system brings up a common 
public sector human resources issue in relation to its impact on recruiting and retaining 
a quality workforce (Frank et al., 2011). 
Consequently, despite the overwhelming private sector trend towards DC plans, DB 
systems are expected to remain dominant in the public sector due to the public pension 
regulatory environment and the nature of the public sector workforce (Almeida et al., 
2009; Munnell et al., 2008b, 2011b). Compared to the private sector, the public sector 
workforce is older, more risk averse, less mobile, and more unionized (Munnell et al., 
2007).  
To date, DC and hybrid systems still make up a very small fraction of state and local 
pension plans and remain for the most part limited to new employees or as a voluntary 
or supplemental option for states that do offer them (Beshears et al., 2011; Pew Center, 
2012).10  Apart from Nebraska, which ran a DC plan as its primary retirement system 
from 1967 to 2002, no state has moved completely away from DB plans (The Pew 
Center, 2010a). According to Munnell et al. (2011b), since 1996, few states have 
adopted a primary DC or Hybrid Plan for new hires: Alaska and Michigan have 
“mandatory defined contribution” plans; five states have “mandatory hybrid” plans (GA, 
IN, MI, OR, and UT); and another seven states offer new employees a choice between 
DC or Hybrid as the primary plan.  Furthermore, they report that from 2008 onwards, 
only Georgia, Michigan, and Utah have introduced new hybrid plans in which new 
employees accrue retirement income under both a DB and DC plan. 
                                                     
10 Beshears et al. (2011) cited findings from a 2009 Pension and Investment (Volume 38, No. 3, p. 
13) survey of the top 1000 U.S. Pension Funds that showed, only 6 percent of total public plan 
assets were managed under a DC plan. The same survey showed 94 of the 222 largest public 
pension plans have a DC component, of which 38 were DC plans with over $1 billion in assets. 
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To date, empirical data on the financial impact of introducing DC/Hybrid plans on 
the overall funded status of state retirement systems is lacking. This is primarily due to 
the limited adoption of DC/Hybrid plans and the difficulty in making comparative 
evaluations across plans given the variety of contribution and investment arrangements.  
The research so far has failed to establish the willingness of current vested public 
employees to give up their highly coveted DB plan memberships and the (guaranteed) 
retirement benefits that accompany it. Additionally, several other factors also 
contribute to the lack of DC/Hybrid pension plan adoption in the public sector. Some of 
the more widely identified constraints were related to legal challenges, human resource 
implications, and the financial illiteracy of public employee participants (Frank, 2012). 
Concluding Remarks 
My discussion in this chapter of the various public pension reform efforts reflects 
the states’ recognition of the serious fiscal implications if they fail to move their 
retirement systems on a path to long-term solvency. In reviewing the information 
provided by the National Conference of State Legislature (NCSL) database of annual 
enacted legislation summaries, the Pew Center of the States (2010a, 2010b, 2012) 
suggest a growing momentum for reform among the states based on the increasing 
number of legislative pension reform related initiatives passed in recent years. As 
introduced in the previous chapter, the Pew Center (2010a) categorized reform efforts 
into five broad areas: (1) keeping up with funding requirements; (2) increasing 
employee contributions; (3) reducing benefits; (4) improving governance and 
investment oversight; and (5) sharing the investment risk with employees through the 
adoption of Defined Contribution and Hybrid Plans.  
I discussed the rationale behind each reform category and cited recently applied 
examples from information available in the NCSL database and various reports. The lack 
of data makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms largely because 
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most of the reforms have been enacted fairly recently.11 For now, most of the analysis 
has been limited to studies that simulate the assumed impact of selected reforms in 
order to project future funding levels (e.g., Novy Marx & Rauh, 2011b; Munnell et al., 
2010). Despite the simulation-type studies,  questions remain about how effective all 
the reforms will truly be in addressing the overall public pension funding situation when 
the overwhelming majority of the reforms are applied solely to new and future public 
employee hires. This is especially true for reform efforts related to reducing benefits and 
increasing employee contribution rates which are generally established in state 
constitutions or by statute (The Pew Center, 2010a).12  
I found that apart from the Pew Center and NCSL reports, most of the discussion 
over public pension reforms has been limited to presenting anecdotal evidence in case 
studies and journalist reporting.  When it comes to the related empirical public pension 
literature, much of the analysis emphasizes plan funding and investment performance 
as a function of plan governance practices and state fiscal factors. This is not surprising 
given how overall funding levels of public pensions are largely determined by their 
investment income, and the longstanding challenging fiscal environment states have 
been operating under.  
Granted that a direct empirical examination of each reform category may not be 
feasible, a useful alternative for policymakers would be a holistic framework by which to 
evaluate the rationale behind each reform category. While such a framework is 
currently lacking in the public pension literature, it would be grounded on the premise 
that all reforms have the general objective of improving the overall funded status of 
                                                     
11 A more feasible approach is to utilize an individual plan-level analysis that looks into a specific 
reform and its impact on plan funding levels since a plan’s actuary firm will likely have the data 
needed to conduct a thorough actuarial valuation of future assets and liabilities. Just as likely 
too, is that the state will have already commissioned the actuarial analysis prior to deciding on 
initiating the legislative process.  
12 In the same report, the Pew Center (2010a, p. 31) cites Ron Snell, the lead administrator of 
the NCSL database, as stating that judges frequently have held that states cannot modify 
pension contracts with existing employees. “Once granted, a pension is a contractual obligation 
of the employer, so that in most states it is impossible to cut the promise of a future benefit 
(Ron Snell, “Pension Tension,” State Legislatures, National Conference of State Legislatures, 
May, 2008.)” 
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their respective retirement systems. The framework is used to show analytically how 
each reform category is linked to a specific DB plan funding component. From there, I 
derive hypotheses relating each reform category to improved funding levels through 
changes in the relevant funding components and its impact on selected DB plan funding 
outcomes.  In the next chapter, I outline such an analytical framework that utilizes the 
DB plan funding structure and process to relate reform-linked-funding components to 
improved funding outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
USING A SIMPLE ASSET-LIABILITY FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE STATE 
DB PENSION FUNDING 
 
In the last chapter, I discussed how an increasing number of states are enacting 
reforms in an effort to restore their respective retirement systems on the path towards 
long-term solvency. These reforms fall into five broad categories and deal with fulfilling 
employer funding obligations, increasing member contributions, reducing retirement 
benefits, improving investment performance through better governance, and 
introducing DC/hybrid plans that apportions more of the risk to the participating 
employee members. Despite the growing impetus for public pension reforms, 
implementation is still largely limited to new employees and future hires. Hence, the 
effectiveness of reform efforts to improve state DB pension funding outcomes is unclear 
at this point because it does not address the pension liabilities already accrued by the 
vast majority of vested public employee participants. Another challenge is the lack of 
empirical data on reform impacts to analyze as most reforms were enacted recently in 
light of the 2007-2009 financial crises.13  
In this chapter, I outline a simple asset-liability framework to describe the basic 
structure and process of funding a typical DB state plan. I use this “balance-sheet like 
approach” to identify key funding components and incorporate the actuarial concepts 
and selected measures of pension plan funding. Instead of directly examining the impact 
of individual pension reform policies, I take the broad categories of reform strategies 
listed in Chapter 2 and show analytically how each category is linked or addresses a 
specific funding component.  Within this framework, I present my hypotheses of how 
plan funding outcomes are affected by changes in the various funding components. Of 
interest is the impact on plan funding from increasing the employer and employee 
                                                     
13 Apart from the actuarial valuations, policy simulation studies that present projected funding 
impacts are more common. For example, see Munnell et al. (2011c) and Novy-Marx and Rauh 
(2011a). 
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contributions and reducing retirement benefit payments. Lastly, I highlight the fiduciary 
role that state governments have in ensuring the solvency of their respective DB 
retirement systems. Using my asset-liability framework, I model the impact on plan 
funding when states fail to keep with their employer contribution requirements. 
Actuarial Valuation of Plan Assets and Liabilities 
Prior to developing my analytical framework, I first give a brief overview of the 
actuarial valuation process and the relevant funding indicators. Consider first that the 
objective of DB plan funding is to build up a fund of investment assets from the 
contributions of both the government employer (plan sponsor) and employees (plan 
members), so that the income from and capital value of those assets are available to 
finance pension obligations upon the retirement of an employee (Blake, 2006a; Blake, 
2006b).  The required size and maturity structure of the fund’s assets necessary to 
match the maturity structure of its liabilities are all determined actuarially.   
Since 1994, the actuarial methods used in valuing state DB plan contributions, 
assets, and liabilities follow the accounting and financial reporting standards established 
under GASB Statements 25 and 27 (Peng, 2008).14 GASB 27 details how plan sponsors 
are to measure and recognize the annual pension cost and unfunded liability and GASB 
25 specifies the guidelines for reporting funding information in the financial statement 
(Peng, 2009).  Below is a summary list by Munnell et al. (2008e, p. 3) of the GASB 25/27 
guidelines and their corresponding parameters: 
(1) Actuarial valuations are performed at least biennially, and present discounted 
value of future benefits should reflect all pension benefits, including ad hoc cost-
of-living increases.  
                                                     
14 GASB Statement No. 25 “Financial Reporting for Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Note 
Disclosures for Defined Contribution Plans” and GASB Statement No. 27 “Accounting for 
Pensions by State and Local Government Employers” were issued concurrently in November 
1994 in order to fill “a void that existed in accounting standards related to accounting and 
reporting pension costs” (Ruppel 2005, p. 220). 
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(2) Actuarial assumptions should incorporate actual experience and investment 
assumptions of expected long-term yield of plan assets. 
(3) Annual required contribution (ARC) should include the cost of benefits accrued 
by plan member employees in the current year (“normal cost”) plus an 
amortized portion of any unfunded actuarial liability. 
(4) An acceptable amortization period (originally up to 40 years but reduced to 30 
years in 2006) should be consistent with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). This amortization period is applied to both the plan’s ‘initial’ 
underfunding and any subsequent underfunding created by benefit increases 
attributed to ‘past service.’ 
Under GASB 25 and 27 public pension plan sponsors must recognize and disclose the 
following information in their financial statement: the fair value of plan assets; plan 
liabilities; plan net assets and annual changes in net assets; required employer and 
employee contributions; and historical information on the ratio of actual plan sponsor 
contributions to the plan sponsor’s ARC.  To summarize, the GASB 25/27 reporting 
framework generates two types of information: (1) current financial information about 
plan assets, and (2) financial activities and actuarial information that provide a long-
term outlook on the plan’s funded status and the progress in accumulating assets to pay 
obligations that become due (Peng, 2009; p321-322).   
GASB Statement 34, issued in 1999 and widely implemented by FY 2003, further 
defined the inclusion of public pension plans in the fiduciary fund group by requiring 
states and local governments to prepare two sets of financial statements for their 
respective pension plans (Peng, 2009):  
(1) A plan’s current financial information appears in the Statement of Plan Net 
Assets and Statement of Changes in Plan Net Assets. 
(2) The plan’s long-term actuarial position is reported in two required schedules 
- the Schedule of Funding Progress and the Schedule of Employer 
Contributions. 
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  Both sets of statements are prepared on a full accrual basis of accounting with a 
measurement focus on economic resources; all inflow and outflow of resources are 
recorded, as long as a monetary value can be attached to them. This means that all 
transactions occurring in the year having a financial impact on a plan are reported 
whether or not cash changes hands. This is different from governmental funds where 
the modified accrual basis of accounting places the measurement focus on current 
financial resources (Mead, 2000; as cited in Peng, 2009). 
Actuarial Measures of Funded Status 
Three measures are commonly used to evaluate the funded status of a DB plan 
derived from the abovementioned actuarial schedules (GAO, 2008). The first measure is 
the pension plan’s funding ratio of plan assets to liabilities; or more formally defined as 
the ratio of actuarial value of assets (present value of accumulated plan assets) to 
actuarial accrued liabilities (present value of accrued plan liabilities). It is the most 
recognized measure of overall pension fund health or summary measure of funded 
status - indicating the extent to which a plan has sufficient assets set aside to pay 
accrued benefits (Mitchell et al., 2001, p. 25). The measure is also referred to as the 
“stock” funding ratio because it gives a snapshot of the plan’s cumulative financial 
health at a moment in time (Mitchell & Smith, 1994; Yang & Mitchell, 2005). A ratio of 
one (or 100%) indicates that a pension plan is fully funded whereas a ratio less than one 
(less than 100%) represent an underfunded status.15   
The second measure is the relative size of a plan’s unfunded obligation for past 
service or unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL). It is derived from the difference 
between the actuarial value of assets (AVA) and accrued actuarial liabilities (UAAL= AVA-
                                                     
15 A funded ratio of at least 80 percent or more represents a commonly held normative view of 
what constitutes a “healthy or responsible” funding level for a public pension plan (e.g. GAO, 
2007, Pew Center, 2007). D’Arcy and Dulebohn (1999) develop a simulation model that 
estimates plan-specific optimal funding levels for state retirement systems as determined by 
several factors that include the level and growth in pension obligations, the state’s current and 
future tax base and interest rates.  
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AAL). The UAAL measure is commonly reported as a percentage of a plan’s annual 
covered payroll to take into account the size of the pension plan (Peng, 2008). 
A favorable funding ratio and UAAL measure represent the fundamental policy 
objective of pension reform. Let us suppose a state DB pension plan records some level 
of underfunding such that the funding ratio is less than 100 percent (AVA - AAL < 0). If 
the state government responds by enacting pension reform policy, the favorable 
funding outcome is manifested through an increase in the plan’s funding ratio and a 
lowering of the unfunded liability measure. 
The third actuarial measure is a pension plan’s flow funding ratio which measures 
the retirement system’s ability to meet its annual required contribution; or in other 
words, it reports the extent to which a plan sponsor is paying down unfunded 
obligations and keeping up with benefits as they accrue.  This measure first defined for 
public pensions by Mitchell and Smith (1994) as the ratio of a plan’s employer’s actual 
contribution (AC) by the plan’s annual required contribution (ARC) gives a “flow” 
perspective on whether the plan sponsor is “setting aside enough money each year to 
meet that year’s [funding] requirements (p. 280).”16 A flow funding ratio of less than 
one (less than 100%) indicates that the actual employer contribution (AC) made by the 
plan sponsor is less than the amount of their annual required contribution (ARC). In 
determining how well governments are meeting their plan’s annual funding needs, 
contributing the full ARC each year is key to maintaining a fully funded plan, or in the 
case of an underfunded plan, necessary for getting the plan back on a path to long-term 
solvency. In more specific terms, paying the full ARC signifies that the plan sponsor has 
set aside sufficient funds to cover currently accruing benefits and the amortized portion 
of any unfunded liability carried over from previous years (Munnell et al., 2008e). 
                                                     
16 The term “required” can be misleading because governments can choose to pay more or less 
than the ARC (GAO, 2008).   
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Linking Reforms to Key DB Funding Components 
Having provided an overview of the relevant GASB guidelines and the major 
actuarial valuation measures used in public pension accounting and financial reporting – 
flow funding ratio, stock funding ratio, the UAAL (%ACP) – I proceed to show these three 
measures, along with the employer contribution rate, serve as the key outcomes 
evaluated in my study of state DB plan funding. I start by incorporating these measures 
into an asset-liability framework that I use in describing the basic structure and process 
in funding a typical state DB plan (see Figure 3-1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1. Increase in Unfunded DB Plan Liabilities Due to Deficient Employer 
Contributions (Note:  AVA–Actuarial Value of Assets; AAL-Actuarial Accrued Liabilities; 
AC-employer’s Actual Contribution; ARC-annual required contribution) 
 
 
 
In summarizing the discussion from the previous chapter and extending it to this 
chapter, the general policy objective of the various categories of public pension reforms 
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is to improve state DB plan funding outcomes by accomplishing either increasing annual 
plan revenues and/or reducing plan expenditures. Data constraints may prevent the 
direct estimation of the actual impact of specific reforms, but each category of public 
pension reforms can analytically be tied to a specific DB funding component.  
Components of State DB Plan Funding 
I use a simple asset-liability framework as illustrated in Figure 3-1 to identify the key 
funding components of a typical state DB pension plan, and how each component is 
associated with a category of pension reforms. Using a “balance-sheet like” approach in 
describing the DB funding structure and process also provides the analytical framework 
for hypothesizing on funding outcomes due to changes in a specific DB plan funding 
component when addressed by a selected category of pension reforms. 
Starting on the asset side, the three primary sources of annual pension plan 
revenues for a state DB pension plan are investment returns, employer contributions, 
and employee contributions.  As noted in Chapter 2, investment returns represent the 
largest and most important source of annual pension fund revenues, a point illustrated 
in Figure 3-1, where Investment Returns is denoted with a much larger rectangular area 
compared to Employee and Employer contributions.  Given the substantial revenue 
share from investment income, the overall funded status of public DB plans is tied 
closely to plan investment performance, which in turn, is a function of the asset 
allocation decisions made by the DB plan sponsor and the overall condition of the 
capital markets. State governments that introduce or consider defined contribution or 
hybrid plans for their new employees, do so as a way of transferring some if not all the 
risk of investment loss, along with the contribution burden, from the plan sponsor to the 
plan employee.  
Despite all the consideration for introducing DC plans, DB pension plans will 
continue to dominate in the public sector given the 90 percent of currently employed 
public employees covered under DB retirement systems. As such, it is more likely that 
the majority of reforms related to pension investment performance are geared towards 
improving DB plan governance and investment oversight. The effectiveness of these 
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reforms will be judged according to the degree they improve plan investment 
performance given the conditions of the financial market and overall macroeconomic 
environment.  
The annual revenue derived from investment income may be stochastic in nature 
but the level of employer and employee contributions, and the size of retirement 
benefits, are much more deterministic. The latter two are mainly defined by statute 
whereas the former depends on the plan sponsor’s contribution behavior. Going back to 
Figure 3-1 as our illustration, the policy objective of reforms addressing any of the three 
annual revenue sources is akin to increasing the size of actuarial asset values as 
represented by the size of both rectangles denoting plan assets, At and At+1.  One can 
see then how the overall funded status of a DB pension plan, as indicated by its stock 
funding ratio, is improved by implementing reforms related to increasing annual plan 
revenues. By increasing plan revenues, the size of actuarial asset values increases 
relative to plan liabilities, and ceteris paribus, this results in a higher stock funding ratio 
and reduces the size of a plan’s unfunded liability. 
I start defining the liability side of my framework by first considering that a defined 
benefit retirement system guarantees the plan member a set level of pension benefits 
calculated from an actuarial formula that includes the years of service, the employee’s 
final average salary, and some pre-determined retirement multiplier (Hustead, 2001).17  
From the plan sponsor’s perspective, the annual benefits paid out to plan retirees, 
usually through life annuities, represent the plan’s primary cash outflow or expense in 
the current period. In FY 2010, retirement benefit payments comprised 94 percent of all 
public pension plan expenditures (Becker-Medina, 2012). As illustrated by the 
rectangular areas Lt and Lt+1. in Figure 3-1, the total actuarial value of liabilities in 
current year t includes not only the benefit payments made to current retirees but the 
                                                     
17 DB plan commonly employ the final average method in which the pension paid is derived 
from the average of the final 3 to 5 years of employment. A survey study by Brainard (2007) 
found that the median FAS retirement multiplier rate for DB public pension plans with and 
without Social Security coverage was 1.9% and 2.2% respectively. Approximately a fourth of 
public employees do not participate in Social Security, including 40 percent of public school 
teachers and a majority of public safety personnel (Brainard, 2011). 
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benefits accrued from past, current, and expected future service of active employees as 
well. When applied to Figure 3-1, reforms that attempt to reduce the cost of retirement 
benefits is analytically equivalent to reducing the area of rectangles Lt and Lt+1.  By 
extension, just as it was on the asset side, reforms that attempt to reduce the size of a 
plan’s total retirement benefit payments translates into lowering the actuarial value of 
plan liabilities, which holding plan assets constant, likewise results in a higher stock 
funding. 
However, as often is the case with theory and application, the actual effectiveness of 
the various public pension reforms is difficult to gauge given the lack of data at this 
point. Still, if we consider the relatively fixed and smaller annual revenue share of 
employee contributions compared to investment income, addressing the former will 
likely be a less effective policy reform option. The effectiveness of improved funding 
outcomes from reforms related to reducing benefits are also questionable given their 
strong legal protections that makes it less likely that states will be able to apply these 
kind of policies beyond new hires. This then leaves us with the category of reforms that 
address how the plan sponsor fulfills its annual contribution requirements. To highlight 
the critical function that employer contributions play in DB pension plan funding 
outcomes, I describe the most common case characterizing DB public pension plans – 
that of being underfunded. 
Applying the Framework to a Two-Period Model of Underfunding 
We can use the asset-liability framework illustrated in Figure 3-1 to derive a general 
hypothesis of retirement system underfunding that relates employer contribution 
behavior with the overall funded status of a DB public pension plan. Specifically, I show 
how a failure by the plan sponsor to fully meet its annual employer contributions leads 
to further deterioration in funding outcomes.  Let us assume a single investment horizon 
from year t to year t+1 for an underfunded state DB plan; that is, AVA<AAL and the plan 
incurs an unfunded liability (UAAL), where t denotes the year in which assets are 
invested with an interest income earned beginning year t+1, and so on. The investment 
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income combined with employee and employer contributions constitutes the total 
pension revenue for the current period.  
Now, if the state pays the full ARC for year t, t+1, and so on, then a portion of the 
UAAL is paid off each year as part of a series of deficiency payments over a specified 
amortization period. Paying the full ARC demonstrates that the state has allocated 
sufficient assets to cover currently accruing benefits along with a portion of any 
unfunded liability carried over from year t-p periods. If the state fails to pay its full ARC 
in year t, a contribution shortfall occurs and gets carried over to the next period; hence, 
increasing the plan’s net pension obligation. Thus, a high ARC value may imply that the 
cost of benefits are relatively high or signal the cumulative negligence of the plan 
sponsor in making its annual employer contribution commitment. 
Holding investment returns constant and ceteris paribus, the state will now have to 
allocate additional funds on top of its annual contribution. In order for the UAAL to be 
amortized on schedule along with the interest incurred on any net pension obligation, 
the employer contribution rate will need to increase in subsequent years starting from 
year t+1. If we extend this asset-liability framework to account for multiple periods, the 
plan’s unfunded liability will likely grow over time if the plan sponsor continues to fail in 
meeting its full actuarial funding requirement.  
An applied test of this framework will allow us to evaluate two empirical questions 
on the employer contribution behavior of state DB plans. The first is related to how well 
states have met their annual employer contribution requirements. The second is related 
to testing the hypothesis that employer contribution behavior is positively related to the 
overall funded status of state DB plans. Answering both questions might yield new 
insights into the fiduciary role of state governments as DB plan sponsors.  
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I outlined a simple asset liability framework that incorporated 
relevant financial and actuarial concepts to describe the funding structure and process, 
and evaluate funding outcomes of a typical state DB pension plan. Four key funding 
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components were identified. The first three components make up the asset side, with 
investment income and contributions from member employees and the plan sponsor as 
primary sources of annual plan revenues, whereas the fourth funding component on the 
liability side is comprised mainly of retirement benefit payments.  
This “balance-sheet like” approach to describing the state DB funding structure and 
process also provides the analytical framework by which to link the various categories of 
pension reforms with a specific funding component. From here, I derived hypotheses on 
the outcomes from changes in the funding components affected by selected categories 
of pension reforms. I showed how the funded status of state DB plans, as indicated by 
the stock funding ratio and the relative size of unfunded liabilities, is positively related 
to increases in the employee and employer contribution rate and reductions in 
retirement benefit payments. Lastly, I applied this framework to model the impact of 
employer contributions on the overall funded status of a DB plan. I showed how the 
overall funded status of a plan can deteriorate over time if the DB plan sponsor, in this 
case, the state government, fails to make the full ARC payment each year. In the next 
chapter, I present the empirical methods for testing these hypothesized DB plan funding 
relationships.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I presented a simple asset-liability framework for describing 
the structure and process of state DB retirement system funding with key components 
and outcomes identified. The framework was used to develop the study’s hypotheses 
for relating the effect of increasing employer and employee contributions and reducing 
benefits on key DB plan funding outcomes. In this chapter, my empirical analysis for 
testing these hypothesized funding relationships is divided into two parts. The first part 
takes into consideration the fiduciary responsibility of states in ensuring the solvency of 
their respective retirement systems. How well the state government fulfills this 
responsibility is reflected by its actual employer contributions relative to the annual 
required contributions (ARC) as determined by system actuaries. I present an empirical 
model that evaluates the determinants of employer contribution rates and flow funding 
ratios, and test the hypothesis that states have underfunded their annual employer 
contributions. The second part of my analysis draws from my analytical framework that 
considers the three general categories of pension reform efforts related to key DB 
funding components, specifically, increases in employer and employee contributions 
and reductions in retiree benefits. I discuss my empirical model for testing the 
hypothesized relationship between these funding components and the funded status of 
a plan as indicated by the stock funding ratio and size of unfunded actuarial accrued 
liabilities. 
In the last part of this chapter, I describe the construction of my panel dataset and 
sample of state DB pension plans. I provide an overview of the panel regression 
methods, present summary statistics, and discuss general trends in my models’ 
dependent and explanatory variables of interest.  
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Empirical Model 
In this study, I examine four funding outcomes of state DB retirement systems: (1) 
the employer contribution rate, (2) the flow funding ratio, (3) the stock funding ratio, 
and (4) the size of a plan’s unfunded actuarial liabilities. For each outcome, I specify a 
panel regression model that takes the general form:  
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝒌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑪𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑇𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡                                            (eq. 4-1) 
Where  i=1,2,…,100 refers to each of the 100 state pension plans in my panel 
dataset; t=2002,2003,…,2010 denotes the time period in years covered in my analysis, 
resulting in a panel with dimensions N x T, where N=100 and T=9; ki,t is the matrix of 
explanatory variables observed for plan i in year t; Ci,t contain the control variables 
comprised of selected plan-level characteristics and state fiscal measures respectively; 
and fundingi,t  is the DB state funding outcome or the dependent variable of the 
specified model.  
The term i + i,t represents the composite error μi,t, where i,t is an independently 
distributed error term with E[i,t]=0 for all i and t, and refers to all the unobserved 
factors affecting plan funding outcomes that change across time as well as across plans; 
i captures all unobserved time-invariant factors that affect a plan’s funding outcome. 
Since i denotes a unique pension plan, we also call i the plan fixed effect. Finally, Tt is a 
vector of year dummy variables to capture year effects common to all state DB plans.  In 
other words, my models control for any unmeasured universal time-related shocks or 
national factors that may have influenced all state DB plans over the study period. 
I direct the first half of my empirical analysis on the determinants of state DB 
pension employer funding behavior. To test the hypothesis that states have 
underfunded their annual employer contributions, a panel regression model of 
employer contribution rates (Model 1, see eq.4-2) and a model of flow funding ratios 
(Model 2) are specified in eq. 4-2 and eq. 4-3 respectively: 
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Model 1: the dependent variable is the employer’s actual contribution rate (ac_acpi,t), 
expressed as a percentage of the plan’s annual covered payroll 
 
ac_acpi,t = β0 + β1 (memcon_acpi,t) + β2 (lnavebeni,t) + β3 (stocki,t)  
      + β4 (arc_acpi,t) + γCi,t + λTt + ηi + εi,t              (eq. 4-2) 
 
Model 2: the dependent variable is the plan’s flow funding ratio (flowi,t) 
flowi,t = β0 + β1 (memcon_acpi,t) + β2 (lnavebeni,t) + β3 (stocki,t)  
  + β4 (arc_acpi,t) + γCi,t + λTt + ηi + εi,t                          (eq. 4-3) 
 
where memcon_acpi,t is the employee contribution rate expressed as a percentage of 
the annual covered payroll; lnavebeni,t is the logarithm of a plan’s average benefit 
payment; stocki,t is the plan’s stock funding ratio and arc_acpi,t is the annual required 
contribution rate expressed as a percentage of annual covered payroll.  For this part of 
the empirical analysis, we are interested in evaluating the estimated coefficient result 
for arc_acpi,t to see if there is evidence for our hypothesis that states have underfunded 
their employer contributions.   
In the second part of my analysis, I specify another two panel regression models (see 
eq. 4-4 and eq. 4-5) to examine the relationship between the key funding components 
of a DB state plan and its overall funded status as indicated by the stock funding ratio 
(Model 3) and unfunded actuarial accrued liabilities (Model 4):  
 
Model 3: - the dependent variable is the plan’s stock funding ratio (stocki,t) 
 
stocki,t = β0 + β1 (memcon_acpi,t) + β2 (lnavebeni,t) + β3 (ac_acpi,t)  
   + β4 (made_arci,t) + γCi,t + λTt + ηi + εi,t                        (eq. 4-4) 
 
Model 4: the dependent variable is the relative size of a plan’s unfunded actuarial 
accrued liability (uaal_acpi,t), expressed as a percentage of the plan’s annual covered 
payroll 
 
uaal_acpi,t = β0 + β1 (memcon_acpi,t) + β2 (lnavebeni,t) + β3 (ac_acpi,t)  
       + β4 (made_arci,t) + γCi,t + λTt + ηi + εi,t                        (eq. 4-5) 
 
Where ac_acpi,t is the employer contribution rate; and made_arci,t is a dummy 
variable to indicate whether the plan made its full annual required contribution; 
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memcon_acpi,t and lnavebeni,t are the same explanatory variables used in Models 1 and 
2. Additionally, all four empirical models use the same set of control variables Ci,t 
comprised of selected plan-level characteristics and state fiscal measures, respectively. 
These include actreti,t, a control for plan member composition between active and 
retired plan members; assumedreti,t the selected discount rate used in the actuarial 
asset valuation; and historicalreti,t the one year actual rate of return on investments. 
Here, the empirical strategy builds on the proposition derived from my analytical 
framework that we can evaluate the funding of certain categories of pension reforms by 
first associating each type of reform with a specific DB funding component. Through this 
approach, I test the hypotheses that reforms related to increasing employee and 
employer contributions positively affect state DB plan stock funding ratios and reduce 
plan unfunded liabilities, and that the same effect, is expected from reforms that reduce 
the size of retirement benefit payments.  
Dependent Variables 
In this section, I review the empirical literature behind the dependent variables 
specified in my panel regression models; where each of the four dependent variables 
represents a key DB funding outcome as described in Chapter 3. 
Employer Contribution Rate and Flow Funding Ratio 
Model 1 is used to analyze the determinants of employer contribution behavior. The 
dependent variable is the plan sponsor’s annual actual employer contribution rate, 
expressed as a percentage of the plan’s payroll. To obtain this variable, I first collect 
data on the total employer contribution amount made for each state DB plan as 
indicated in the CAFR Statement of Changes in Plan Net Assets section.  I then divide this 
amount by the plan’s annual covered payroll to scale it according to plan size and 
standardize it according to the ARC measure as defined under GASB 25. 
The public pension funding study by Mitchell and Smith (1994), who analyzed cross-
sectional 1989 data on per-worker actual and required employer contributions of 42 
public pension plans from 31 states, is the only known empirical evaluation which 
directly looks at the determinants of actual employer contributions. Mitchell and Smith 
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(1994) hypothesized that actual employer contributions are characterized by either 
behavioral persistence or regression-to-the-mean funding behavior. The former implies 
that past long-term funding behavior produces a positive unitary relationship with flow 
funding. The latter predicts periods of underfunding and overfunding follow each other, 
resulting in an offsetting or non-significant relationship between stock funding and 
employer contribution efforts. They also found that while stock funding positively 
affects current employer funding, it is not a unitary relationship. They suggested that 
employer funding in public pension plans exhibit some form of behavioral persistence 
attenuated by a regression-to-the-mean funding behavior.  
Young (2008) provides a more recent discussion of PERS employer contribution rates 
as defined in this study. Employer contribution rate volatility is traced to the failure of 
governments to make the necessary annual required contributions; unfunded and ad-
hoc retirement benefit increases; and the pursuit of higher risk and higher return asset 
allocation strategies. 18 Young (2008) goes on to discuss examples of strategies and 
practices carried out to mitigate rate fluctuations. These include spreading or smoothing 
asset gains and losses over longer periods; requiring minimum contribution rates; and 
restricting rate changes. Nevertheless, Young (2008) argues that despite efforts to limit 
employer contribution rate volatility, “as long as investments by public retirement 
systems continue to emphasize higher-risk, equity asset classes, some volatility will 
remain” (p. 83).  
As employer contributions make up one of three major sources of annual pension 
fund revenues, the employer contribution rate is specified in Models 3 and 4 as an 
explanatory variable of stock funding and unfunded plan liabilities, respectively. On the 
surface, greater employer contributions should translate into higher funding levels. This 
positive relationship was posited by Doyle (2005) who used a pooled five-year cross-
sectional dataset of SLG pension plans but found instead that an increase in the 
                                                     
18 Young (2008) gives examples of governments who instituted contribution holidays during 
periods of above-average investment returns. 
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employer contribution rate was associated with a lower stock funding ratio.19  Although 
Doyle (2005) fails to discuss their result, it suggests that the funding relationship 
between the employer contribution rate and stock is more of an endogenous process in 
which the plan sponsor contributes more in order to cover any funding shortfall as 
indicated by a lower stock funding ratio. 
Building on the first dependent variable, the flow funding ratio is the second 
dependent variable analyzed. As defined in the Chapter 3, it is simply the ratio of a 
plan’s actual employer’s actual contribution (AC) to its annual required employer 
contribution (ARC). To obtain this measure, I first get my ARC data from the state or plan 
CAFR Required Schedule of Employer Contributions section, which will often include 
information as well on the actual employer contribution and/or the flow funding ratio or 
percentage contributed as required under GASB 25 (Peng 2008).  This “flow” pension 
funding measure was first defined in Mitchell and Smith (1994), and Mitchell and Hsin 
(1997) were the first to empirically examine its determinants. The authors used a cross-
sectional survey of 269 SLG pension plans from 1991 and specified a model of flow 
funding with explanatory variables covering five categories: pension board composition, 
board management practices, investment practices, reporting requirements, and 
assumptions. Their results showed that only board member liability insurance coverage 
and board authorized actuarial assumptions were found to significantly affect the flow 
funding ratio. 
In their review of the empirical pension funding literature, Yang and Mitchell (2005) 
noted that most of the studies analyzed cross-sectional data using single equation 
                                                     
19 The dataset used by Doyle (2005) to evaluate stock funding is commonly referred to as the 
“PENDAT” files, made up of a series of periodic surveys conducted by the Public Pension 
Coordinating Council (PPCC) to determine the funded status of SLG pension plans from the 
following years: 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000 (Harris, 2002). When pooled, the 
PENDAT files formed an unbalanced panel dataset that ranged from a sample of 124 plans 
surveyed in FY 1990 to as many as 228 plans surveyed in FY 1996. Doyle’s PENDAT sample 
consisted of the following fiscal years (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000). The Public Pension 
Coordinating Council was a confederation of three national associations serving state and local 
government retirement plans: The National Association of State Retirement Administrators 
(NASRA), The National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems (NCPERS), and The 
National Council on Teacher Retirement (NCTR). 
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models. They argued that prior studies failed to account for endogeneity of plan funding 
and investment performance such that funding results in one year may be related to 
lagged funding measures. According to Yang and Mitchell (2005), they address these 
econometric issues by running pooled OLS on seven years of PENDAT survey results 
using the same flow funding and stock funding model from Mitchell and Hsin (1997).20 
Yang and Mitchell (2005) found that a one percentage point increase in the stock 
funding ratio was associated with a 0.45 percentage point increase in the flow funding 
ratio. They suggested that the positive but less-than unitary relationship between stock 
and flow funding lends support to Mitchell and Smith’s (1994) conclusion that public 
pension funding persistence is attenuated by mean reversion effects.  Yang and Mitchell 
also found a positive relationship between flow funding plans that assumed a longer 
amortization period for accrued liabilities; and plans having more retirees as board 
members, and states having a dedicated tax for financing pension contributions, have a 
negative effect on flow funding.  
Using the same PENDAT dataset, Eaton and Nofsinger (2004), as part of their 
analysis of flow funding ratios, proposed an adjusted flow funding measure that 
standardized the required employer contributions to account for differences in the 
actuarial asset valuation assumptions used by the public pension plans in their sample.21 
In comparing their adjusted flow funding measure to the regular unadjusted flow 
funding measure along with the rest of their analysis, they found evidence that actuarial 
assumptions, particularly the salary growth rate and discount rate, were manipulated 
for plans in states experiencing high political pressure and fiscal stress.   
                                                     
20 Yang and Mitchell (2005) use the same PENDAT files as Doyle (2005), but add two more years 
of survey results from 1990 and 1991.  
21 Eaton and Nofsinger (2004) assume an equivalent salary growth rate (5.99%) and discount 
rate (7.86%) to standardize required contribution levels.  From an ex-post perspective, their 
rationale is valid since their pooled cross-sectional sample covered fiscal years 1990 to 1996, a 
period prior to the implementation of GASB 25 and 27 that standardized public pension 
accounting and reporting (Steffen, 2001). Since the data I use are from subsequent periods 
wherein CAFRs are prepared according to these GASB standards, I assume the ARC values in my 
flow funding ratios are sufficient and valid for comparing across plans. 
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My flow-funding ratio is also specified as an explanatory variable in Models 3 and 4, 
but instead of using the ratio measure as is, I specify a dummy variable indicating if the 
plan employer paid at least 100 percent of its ARC for that given year.  The model 
predicts higher stock funding ratios and less unfunded liabilities for plans that make the 
full ARC payment compared to plans that fail to pay their full ARC.  The hypothesis 
draws from my analytical framework in Chapter 3 where I directly relate a plan’s overall 
funded status to the degree by which the public plan sponsor is making its ARC 
payments. For this particular dummy variable indicator of flow-funding dummy, its 
determinants were examined by Munnell et al. (2008d, 2011c) for two separate fiscal 
years (FY 2006 and 2008) using cross-sectional data on 126 SLG plans from the NASRA 
and NCTR Public Funds Survey (PFS) and Public Plans Database at the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College (CRC).22 Both studies, using similarly specified 
probit regression models, found that a higher state debt to GSP ratio, and the use of 
projected-unit-cost (PUC) actuarial valuation method, made it less likely for a plan 
sponsor to make 100 percent of its ARC payment. Having a large public pension plan, a 
larger proportion of active to retired employees on the pension board, and Social 
Security coverage for plan members, were the other factors associated with a lower 
likelihood of a full ARC payment being made. 
Stock Funding Ratio and UAAL as a % of ACP 
By definition, since UAAL=AVA-AAL, the plan’s stock funding ratio (Model 3 
dependent variable), computed as the ratio of a plan’s actuarial value of assets (AVA) to 
its accrued actuarial liabilities (AAL), is used to derive the dependent variable for Model 
4, the size of a plan’s unfunded liabilities, expressed as a percentage of its annual 
                                                     
22 For FY 2006 as analyzed in Munell et al. (2008d), data came from the Public Funds Survey is 
sponsored by the National Association of State Retirement Administrators and the National 
Council on Teacher Retirement. The database is maintained by Keith Brainard, NASRA Research 
Director, and accessed from http://www.publicfundsurvey.org. It is more or less an offshoot of 
the PPCC PENDAT files that covered public pension funding from 1990 to 2002. For FY 2008 as 
analyzed in Munnell et al. (2011c), data came from the Public Plans Database, which is produced 
and maintained by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, and whose director is 
Alicia H. Munnell. The database, available at http://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database/, is 
co-sponsored by the Center for State and Local Government Excellence (CSLGE). 
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covered payroll (uaal_acp). Data for all variables comes from the state or plan CAFR 
Required Schedule of Funding Progress section.   
A review of the pension funding literature shows that apart from the pension fund 
performance and governance, the stock funding ratio is the most commonly evaluated 
pension funding measure (Schneider, 2005). Just as it was with studies that examined 
flow funding ratios, the majority of studies that examined stock funding ratios were 
based on estimating cross-sectional data with single equation models (Yang & Mitchell, 
2005). Recent examples in the literature include Munnell et al. (2011c, 2008d) who 
analyze stock funding ratio data from 126 plans for fiscal years 2006 and 2008 
separately.23 Both studies showed that lower stock funding was associated with plans 
using the PUC actuarial valuation method and when teachers were included in the plan. 
Conversely, larger plans and plans having a separate investment council positively 
influenced stock funding ratios. The former result is interesting because it complements 
my hypothesis on the relationship between stock and flow funding. As Munnell (2011c, 
2008a) reported, larger plans having more assets were associated with lower flow 
funding ratios. When considered altogether, the results suggest that that plans having 
more assets, holding all else constant, translates into a higher stock funding ratio, and in 
turn, results in a lower required employer contribution rate. However, the plan sponsor 
ends up contributing even less because it assumes continuing favorable investment 
returns in the future. 
Results from several longitudinal pension funding studies have provided insight on 
the temporal aspects of various stock funding determinants. In relating those results to 
the explanatory variables specified in my own empirical model of stock funding, the 
literature provides evidence of the significant influence of the following determinants: 
plan member composition (Giertz & Papke, 2007, Eaton & Nofsinger, 2008); investment 
rate of return (Yang & Mitchell, 2005); discount rate (Doyle, 2005), and various fiscal 
                                                     
23 The two studies utilized the same set of pension funding data used in analyzing flow funding 
ratios analyzed in Munnell et al (2011c and 2008a). 
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indicators such as the per capita tax revenue (Giertz & Papke, 2007), the ratio of interest 
paid to revenue (Eaton & Nofsinger, 2008), and debt to GDP income ratio (Doyle 2005).  
Following Mitchell and Smith’s (1994) behavioral persistence hypothesis of pension 
funding that relates a plan’s cumulative financial health with current funding efforts, I 
use the stock funding ratio as an explanatory variable in Models 1 and 2 in determining 
both the actual employer contribution rate and flow funding ratio. Based on this 
hypothesis, we would expect stock funding to positively influence both indicators of 
public pension plan employer contribution behavior. 24  
My fourth and last dependent variable is the unfunded actuarial accrued liability, 
expressed as a percentage of the plan’s annual covered payroll (uaal_acp).  When we 
consider that this indicator has been available in state and plan CAFRs since 1997 as part 
of GASB 25, it is surprising to find that an empirical assessment of this unfunded liability 
measure is lacking in the literature. To date, the only econometric study that focuses 
solely on the determinants of unfunded pension liability is that by Coggburn and 
Kearney (2010) who examined the per capita unfunded pension liability at the state 
level of both regular pension and other post-employment benefits (OPEBs). Using cross-
sectional data from the Pew Center on the unfunded pension liability of all 50 states for 
FY 2007, the authors found a positive relationship between a state’s per capita 
unfunded pension liability with the employer contribution rate, public employee density 
per 10,000 population, state per capita personal income, and the ratio of state interest 
payments to total revenue.  A novel contribution of the study was to examine the 
managerial influence of state administrators on state pension unfunded liability.  Using 
indicators from the Governance Performance Project, Coggburn and Kearney’s (2010) 
analysis suggested that states with better financial management capacity and human 
resource management were associated with lower unfunded pension liabilities.25 
                                                     
24 See Mitchell and Hsin (1997), Mitchell and Smith (1994), and Yang and Mitchell (2005) 
25 Barrett, K. and Greene, R. 2005. “Grading the States ’05: The Year of Living Dangerously.” 
Governing, 18(5): 24–95, as cited in Coggburn and Kearney (2010). 
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Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables in my panel regression models are drawn directly from the 
asset-liability framework in Chapter 3. Each of the variables is hypothesized to directly 
affect the DB public pension funding outcomes, they are specified as follows: the plan’s 
employee contribution rate reported as a percentage of the plan’s annual payroll; the 
logarithm of average plan benefit payments; and the one-year rate of return on 
investments. I also include as additional predictors, the plan’s stock funding ratio and 
annual required contribution rate for my pension funding model of employer 
contribution rates (Model 1) and flow funding (Model 2). 
Employee Contribution Rate 
In theory, if we were to hold the number of active plan members constant, increases 
in the employee contribution rate (memcon_acp) increases the amount of revenue 
inflows and would thus be expected to have a positive effect on a plan’s overall funded 
status. Alternatively, if we take the perspective that the plan sponsor increases the 
member contributions to reduce the ARC, then the effect of increasing the employee 
contribution rates is to shift the more of the pension cost burden from the employer to 
plan members (GAO 2012a). 
State DB plan employee members normally contribute a statutorily set percentage 
of their annual wage. Most state plans administer multi-tiered employee contribution 
rates, where new plan members are required to contribute at a higher rate than older 
members do. Because it requires access to relevant member and rate information, an 
ideal but less feasible approach would be to compute the plan’s average employee 
contribution rate. For the purpose of this study, I use the aggregate plan employee 
contributions as reported in the CAFR Statement of Changes in Plan Net Assets and 
express it as a percentage of the plan’s annual covered payroll. 
LOG average annual plan benefit payment 
Under GASB 25, total annual plan benefit payments is recorded as part of the 
‘Deductions’ in the Statement of Changes in Plan Net Assets in either the state CAFR 
section for pension trust funds or the CAFR of the pension plan itself (Peng, 2009). I use 
this data and divide it by the number of retired plan members and then derive the 
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logarithm of the average annual plan benefit payment, labeled lnaveben, to obtain this 
variable. Holding the number of retirees and beneficiaries constant, reducing retirement 
benefits reduces the amount of pension liabilities thus resulting in a lower lnaveben. 
Lowering the value of lnaveben in turn is expected to produce favorable funding 
outcomes as indicated by higher plan funding ratios and fewer unfunded pension 
liabilities. 
One-year rate of return on investment and Annual Required Contribution Rate 
As investment income comprises the largest proportion of annual public pension 
plan revenues, the one-year rate of return on investments variable, historicalret, is 
expected to have a significant impact on both employer contribution behavior and the 
overall funded status. However, the degree to which a higher investment rate of return 
increases a plan’s stock funding ratio, and reduces its unfunded liability, may be 
attenuated by the actuarial smoothing assumptions applied in valuing plan asset 
investments.  On the surface, higher investment income means that the plan’s asset 
holdings increased relative to its liabilities, and as a consequence, the plan sponsor’s 
required contribution rate (ARC) is expected to be lower as well ceteris paribus.  With a 
lower ARC, holding all other things constant, the plan sponsor should be in a better 
position to fully meet its current employer contributions, resulting in a higher flow 
funding ratio. But what happens in practice as widely cited anecdotally in the literature, 
is that the plan sponsor tends to shirk on its annual funding obligations as it develops 
optimistic expectations of an upward or favorable trend in investment returns moving 
forward. Thus, it would not be unexpected to find an inverse relationship between 
historicalret and ac_acp, and also between historicalret and flow. 
For econometric modeling purposes, an explanatory variable category for plan level 
actuarial assumptions is invariably specified in the empirical pension funding literature. 
The specified variables from this category range from the actuarial costing method to 
the length of the amortization period. All these assumptions are used in valuing plan 
assets and liabilities, and ultimately determine the plan’s ARC. As earlier defined, the 
ARC is the actuarially determined amount that the plan sponsor needs to pay in order to 
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cover current year benefits accrued (normal cost) and an amortization of any UAAL.  
Therefore, instead of including all these different actuarial assumptions in my panel 
regression models, I assume that the ARC is a better explanatory variable because it 
incorporates already, all the relevant actuarial assumptions.  Holding everything else 
constant, my model predicts a positive relationship between ARC and AC, and an inverse 
relationship between ARC and the flow funding ratio. The size of the estimated 
coefficient for the ARC variable will be of major interest because the difference from 
ideal unitary relationship between ARC and AC determines the degree by which the plan 
sponsor is underfunding its employer contributions. 
Other Plan-Level Control Variables 
Plan level controls in all models include a control for plan size in terms of 
membership and current level of total assets at market price.  I use the ratio of active 
members to plan retirees and their beneficiaries for the former and the logarithm of 
total plan assets in the latter.  
In studying the impact of gender differences on public pension funding levels, Eaton 
and Nofsinger (2008) found that plans with a higher ratio of retirees to active members 
were more underfunded. Although Eaton and Nofsinger (2008) do not explain this 
finding, it could be that the result is due to a larger outflow of benefit payments (plan 
liabilities) when the proportion of retirees increase. Vice versa, I expect a mirror result 
with positive funding outcomes associated with plans having a greater proportion of 
active members to retirees due to higher revenue inflows from member contributions 
relative to retirement benefit payments.   
In controlling for plan size according to asset holdings, larger plans are expected to 
have better funding outcomes; with more assets, plans have a greater capacity to better 
handle annual revenue changes if investment returns become volatile. Using the same 
longitudinal dataset on public pension funding compiled from seven years of PENDAT 
surveys, Yang and Mitchell (2005) and Listokin (2006) found contrasting results on the 
relationship between stock funding and asset size (as expressed in logarithm terms). 
While the former finds no statistically significant association, the latter shows that plan 
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assets lagged one period earlier has a positive effect on current stock funding.  Neither 
study discusses their result for this variable, but the results might suggest that for this 
sample of surveyed SLG pension plans from the 1990s, current year actuarial valuations 
more fully incorporated past market values, rather than the current market value, of 
total plan assets. 
A variation on using plan asset size as a control variable in analyzing pension funding 
levels was used by Munnell et al. (2008c, 2008d, 2011c). In their separate cross-section 
regression analyses of 2006 and 2008 fiscal year funding data of public pension plans, an 
indicator variable was used to denote plans as being a “large plan” if they belonged in 
the top third of their sample in terms of assets. Munnell and colleagues found that 
“large plans” were positively related to the stock funding ratio but less likely to pay the 
full ARC. 
To capture the actuarial nature of the dependent variables in all four empirical 
models, I include another key parameter used in calculating asset values - the 
assumption made by actuaries about expected plan investment returns.  The assumed 
rate of return variable is the rate used for discounting the current and future streams of 
revenues and benefits earned to determine the present value of all assets and liabilities. 
In a time value of money context, a higher discount rate lowers the present value of 
liabilities and unfunded liabilities and results in a lower annual required contribution 
needed to amortize those same liabilities.26 As highlighted in the studies of Novy-Marx 
and Rauh (2009, 2011a, 2011b), the debate over the appropriate discount rate in 
valuing pension liabilities is related to the various actuarial assumptions that public 
retirement systems incorporate in their respective plan valuations. In one of the first 
studies to evaluate the discount rates used by state retirement systems, Chaney et al. 
                                                     
26 In practice, plan actuaries calculate the discount rate based on the expected price inflation 
and the real rate of return.  In a recent example provided by a March 14, 2012 CalPERS Press 
Release (see http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2012/mar/discount-
rate.xml), the CalPERS Actuarial Office recommended that the CalPERS discount rate of 7.75% be 
adjusted to 7.25%. They derived this value by adding the current real return of 4.75% to a lower 
price inflation assumption (from 3 to 2.75%). The press release also highlighted how the lower 
discount rate affects plan employer contributions and the value of member benefits. 
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(2002) analyzed state level pension funding data for 44 states from FY 1994 and FY 1995 
and found that fiscally stressed states with balanced budget requirements strategically 
selected higher discount rates. In a subsequent study, Eaton and Nofsinger (2004) 
uncover a similar result at the individual pension plan level. Using five years of PENDAT 
surveys, they hypothesized that a combination of fiscal and political factors spur public 
plan sponsors to manipulate actuarial assumptions in order to appear better funded. 
More specifically, Eaton and Nofsinger (2004) showed states assumed a higher rate of 
return on plan assets when experiencing more fiscal stress (as indicated by increases in 
the ratio of interest payments to revenue and public debt to revenue). Also using five 
years of PENDAT surveys, a pooled OLS analysis by Doyle (2005) found the discount rate 
was negatively associated with stock funding ratio. Doyle’s hypothesis on the inverse 
relationship between the discount rate and stock funding was that a higher discount 
rate presumes the plan actuaries are expecting greater returns from the financial 
markets, thus lowering the contribution levels required of the plan sponsor. Following 
the literature then, I expect to find the assumed rate of return is inversely related to 
employer contribution efforts but positively related to overall plan funded levels. 
Several studies have shown a significant relationship between state fiscal condition 
and public pension funding levels. I follow Chaney et al. (2002) who uses the annual 
year-ended unreserved General Fund balance (gfbal_urpc1k) as scaled by the state’s 
population. In their study, Chaney et al. (2002) explain that gfbal_urpc1k, being a 
cumulative measure, is an appropriate indicator of long-run state fiscal condition. They 
also point out the importance of the general fund as being, “…the fund in which most 
state tax revenue is recognized and from which most current spending is financed” (p. 
296). While some have questioned using general fund data to measure state financial 
condition (e.g., Wang et al., 2007), the clear link between the general fund and public 
pension funding is established by Peng (2004, 2008): 
“For state and local governments, most of the pension contributions going into the 
pension trust fund originally come out of the general fund, which is the government’s 
main operating fund…When viewed in this broader context, public pension funding is no 
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longer an isolated pension financing issue, but rather part of the overall resource 
allocation decision in the public sector” (Peng 2008, p. 142). 
The above statement about the relationship between public budgeting and public 
pension financial management draws from the fiscal stress theory of public pension plan 
underfunding.  Past studies examining the impact of various state fiscal indicators on 
public pension funding found that states experiencing some form of fiscal stress or 
unfavorable economic condition tend to have underfunded pension plans.27 This theory 
of public pension funding behavior maintains that during periods of fiscal or economic 
stress or in the presence of statutory budget constraints (e.g., balanced budget 
requirements), governments will tend to underfund their pension plans by reducing 
employer contributions to free up funds for other budgetary items of greater priority or 
urgent financial need (Peng, 2004). Assuming this supposition holds, I expect better 
funding outcomes for DB plans in states having larger unreserved general fund balances. 
Estimation Strategy 
The standard approach to econometric modeling of panel data usually applies two 
principal approaches, namely, fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimators.  If 
the unobserved time-invariant DB plan effects are uncorrelated with all the observed 
explanatory variables, then using the RE estimator is the appropriate method 
(Wooldridge, 2008).  However, plan level characteristics vary greatly across DB state 
retirement systems in all aspects of plan funding that range from membership coverage, 
board composition, to the actuarial valuation methods used.  Consequently, omitted 
variable bias is a concern when we fail to include any of these characteristics in our 
                                                     
27 Some of the fiscal stress indicators examined include the following: the unemployment rate 
(Schneider & Damanpour, 2002); state debt/income ratio (Munnell et al., 2008c); state debt 
ratings (Listokin, 2006); ratio of state’s annual interest payments to total state revenue (Eaton & 
Nofsinger, 2004; Coggburn & Kearney, 2010); and the presence of balanced budget 
requirements (Chaney et al., 2002). While I included these alternative measures in my 
preliminary model specifications, I selected the general fund balance as my primary state fiscal 
indicator since it would most directly relate to the employer contribution behavior and relevant 
DB plan funding outcomes in my study as described in my asset-liability framework. 
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regression models that are correlated with our included explanatory funding variables. 
To control for the possibility that unobserved time-invariant plan specific characteristics 
systematically affect plan funding outcomes, I estimate my model using a fixed effects 
approach to estimating my regression models.  I also include year dummies to control 
any unmeasured national factors or universal time shocks that affected all the plans in 
my sample. 
Description of the Dataset 
My analysis utilizes a sample of 100 state administered DB pension plans from 50 
states over a nine-year period covering fiscal years 2002 to 2010. This unique panel data 
set pulls together information obtained from government reports consisting of 
comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs) from both the state government and 
whenever available, from the state retirement system itself.  The information on state 
pension trust funds found in the CAFRs is prepared according to GASB 25, 27, and 34 
reporting guidelines, thus ensuring a level of standardization that allows us to compare 
pension funding indicators across state retirement systems.  
Other sources of data include the US Census Bureau State and Local Government 
Employee Retirement Systems Survey (SLGERS) and the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  Due to data collection costs and constraints, my sample is limited to plans 
covering general state employees and teachers, which typically represent the largest 
retirement plans administered at the state level.  Asset holdings in FY 2010 for the plans 
in my sample was an estimated $2.1 trillion, which represents over 90 percent of total 
assets held by all state administered plans for that fiscal year.  
Table 4-1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the study’s 
empirical models for my entire panel consisting of 100 individual state pension plans 
covering nine fiscal years from 2002 to 2010. A cursory glance of the panel mean for 
flow and stock funding ratios and comparing actual and required employer contribution 
rates suggests underfunding in general - with the plans in my sample making 91 percent 
of annual required employer contributions (flow funding), and setting aside assets that 
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cover 82 percent of their total actuarial liabilities (stock funding). Underfunding at the 
plan sponsor level is also immediately apparent as the panel mean for the actual 
employer contribution rate (AC), 10.16 percent, is less than that of the annual required 
contribution rate (ARC) of 12.03 percent. As shown in Table 4.1, scaling by the annual 
covered payroll allows us to show the limited share and variability of employee 
contributions relative to employer contributions and total unfunded actuarial liabilities. 
Also notable from Table 4-1 is the 5.27 average rate of return on investments recorded 
by the plans in my sample over the panel’s nine-year period, which is less than the panel 
mean for the assumed rate of return of 8 percent. It is this gap between the assumed 
and actual investment rate of return that represents the source of debate between 
economists and public retirement system administrators over the appropriate discount 
rate in valuing public pension plan assets. 
I use line graphs in Figures 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3 to show how the primary pension 
funding outcomes and selected plan level variables relate to each other over time. By 
definition, the inverse relationship between the stock funding ratio and unfunded 
liability is shown in Figure 4-1. The considerable rise in unfunded pension obligations is 
evident in the graph were the size of unfunded pension liabilities in FY 2010 was an 
estimated 197 percent larger than it was in FY 2002. 
The line graphs in Figure 4.1 show flow funding ratios and stock funding ratios 
following a similar trend over the course of the sample period with both indicators 
exhibiting declining ratios from FY 2002 to FY 2005, followed up an uptick in both ratios 
onwards until FY 2007.  The dramatic deterioration in both funding measures starting 
around FY 2008 because of the financial crisis is noticeable.   
Because flow funding is a function of how well the plan employer is fulfilling its 
annual required contributions, the line graph in Figure 4-2 illustrates the persistent gap 
between the annual required contribution rate (ARC) and the plan employer’s actual 
contribution rate (AC). 
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Table 4-1. Variable Descriptions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics (100 State DB Plans, 
FY 2002-FY 2010) 
VARIABLE LABEL DEFINITION Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Dependent Variables       
ac_acp employer 
contribution rate 
Employer contributions as a 
percentage of the plan's annual 
covered payroll 
10.16 9.23 
flow Flow Funding Ratio Employer's actual contribution 
(AC) / Employer's annual required 
contribution (ARC) 
90.50 31.32 
stock Stock Funding Ratio Actuarial value of plan assets 
(AVA) / actuarial accrued liabilities 
(AAL); in percent 
82.40 16.58 
uaal_acp Unfunded liability Unfunded actuarial accrued 
liability as a % of annual covered 
payroll 
86.20 266.90 
Plan Level Variables       
ln_netasset ln plan net assets natural log of DB plan net assets 16.23 1.13 
historicalret 1 year ROR Historical 1 year DB plan annual 
investment return (%) 
5.27 12.36 
assumedret discount rate Assumed rate of return on plan 
investments (%) 
7.99 0.37 
memcon_acp member 
contributions 
Member contributions as a % of 
annual covered payroll 
5.69 3.12 
arc_acp ARC Employer's annual required 
contribution rate expressed as a % 
of annual covered payroll 
12.03 10.43 
made_arc made ARC dummy Dummy variable indicating 
whether plan sponsor paid 100% 
of their ARC 
0.54 n.a. 
lnaveben ln average benefit 
payments 
Natural log of DB plan's annual 
average benefit payments 
9.80 0.45 
actret ratio active to retired Ratio of active plan members to 
plan beneficiaries 
2.61 4.10 
State Fiscal Characteristic       
gfbal_urpc1k pcap 
GFbal_unreserved(1k) 
per capita unreserved General 
Fund balance ($1000s) 
0.21 1.51 
Note: All variables from state or plan CAFR except for made_arc and gfbal_urpc1k are 
author's calculations 
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Figure 4-1. Stock & Flow Funding, Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liabilities, FY 2002-2010 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Employer & Employee Contribution Rates, FY 2002-2010 
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Figure 4-3. Employer, Member Contributions, & Net Investment Income, FY 2002-2010  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4. Actual & Assumed Rate of Returns, FY 2002-2010 
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 With the fiscal year along the x-axis aligned vertically across both graphs, we see 
how the changes in the gap distance between ARC and AC in Figure 4-2 visually relate to 
flow funding levels in Figure 4-1.  Having the annual covered payroll as a common scale, 
we can compare the relative size of the two primary sources of pension contributions.  
Figure 4-2 shows that plan member employees not only contribute less than plan 
employers but also follow much more stable contribution rates as well. 
By aligning vertically along the years on the x-axis, we can also observe the general 
trend or shape of the line graph over time for flow funding in Figure 4-1 and its 
relationship to that of the line graphs for ARC and employer contributions in Figure 4-2. 
As the rate for ARC increases, so does employer contributions but at a lower rate, 
creating gaps reflected in the shape of the line graph for flow funding over the sample 
period as shown in Figure 4-2. The plan sponsors in my panel on average failed to 
increase their contributions at the same rate as ARC, and this manifested in widening 
the gap between required and actual employer contributions. When scaled by the 
annual covered payroll, Figure 4-3 provides a dynamic view on the considerable impact 
that investment returns have on annual pension plan revenues.  This is made clear by 
the relative size of investment returns compared to both employer and employee 
contributions. 
Apart from the sizeable share and impact on pension revenues, the volatility of 
investment returns relative to the assumed rate of return for state pension plans in my 
sample is displayed in Figure 4-4.  One can also see the effect of the economic and 
market downturns of 2001-2002 and 2007-2008 in the line graph of the historical one-
year rate of return variable.  In practice, actuaries for state pension plans employ a 
smoothing period by which to calculate the value of current assets based on an average 
value of a selected number of past years.  By averaging out the effects of increases or 
decreases in market values each year over several years (generally four or five), the 
effect of this approach is to smooth out or dampen the immediate impact of these 
severe market drops or spikes in growth and spread it out over time. Because states 
vary widely in their actuarial practice of smoothing gains and losses on invested assets, 
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the impact of market changes over time also has varying perceived effects on state 
funding levels (The Pew Center, 2007).28   
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presented the research methodology and panel dataset used for 
evaluating state DB pension funding. Empirical models were specified to analyze four 
key funding outcomes at the plan level – the employer contribution rate, flow funding 
ratio, stock funding ratio, and the relative size of unfunded liabilities.  The fixed effects 
panel regression approach was identified as the appropriate econometric strategy to 
estimate the specified models. I specified and discussed the explanatory and control 
variables along with a review of their use in past empirical studies. Descriptive statistics 
of key DB funding variables for my sample of 100 state DB plans in Table 1 and the 
graphs of their trends over the last decade in Figures 4-1 to 4-4 provided an empirical 
overview on the hypothesized funding relationships that determine DB public pension 
plan funding.  First, it showed how the trend for stock and flow funding ratios were 
opposite that of the unfunded liability indicator. Second, it showed that over the same 
period, actual employer contribution rates failed to keep up with annual required 
employer contribution rates, and that member/employee contribution rates were 
relatively fixed and comprised a small share of annual plan revenues. The graphs also 
illustrated the substantial role of investment income on plan revenues in terms of total 
revenue share and volatility. Lastly, I noted the trend in total retirement benefit 
payments increasing every year and its implications for future DB funding outcomes. 
In the next chapter, I report and discuss the results of my panel regression models 
used to test the various hypothesized DB state pension plan funding relationships. 
 
Copyright © Cezar Brian Mamaril 2013  
                                                     
28 The Pew Center (2007) provides example of states that use longer smoothing periods like 
Colorado (4 years) and California (15 years) to show how they retain good and bad years over 
time. This is contrasted to states like Idaho, Illinois, Oregon and West Virginia, that are expected 
to show dramatic year-to-year shifts because they use a fair market value approach over a short 
smoothing period for valuing their major pension plans. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the empirical methods used in this study to 
evaluate DB state pension plan funding. Four panel regression models were specified to 
examine the determinants of employer contribution rates (ac_acp), flow and stock 
funding ratios (flow and stock), and the relative size of plan unfunded liabilities 
(uaal_acp). I presented the panel dataset comprised of 100 state DB pension plans 
covering fiscal years 2002 to 2010, along with the dependent and explanatory variables 
in my panel regression models. Based on the initial review of the descriptive statistics 
and graphs of annual aggregate trend, the explanatory variables reflect a positive 
funding relationship with the first three dependent variables of interest (ac_acp, flow, 
and stock) and an inverse relationship with the unfunded liability indicator (uaal_acp). 
This implies that in general, the sign of the estimated coefficients from the ac_acp, flow 
and stock panel regression models is expected to be opposite those of obtained from 
the uaal_acp model. 
In this chapter, I discuss the results of my panel regression analysis. Table 5-1 
presents the estimated coefficients from the OLS and Fixed-Effects (FE) regression 
models of employer contribution rates (Model 1) and flow funding (Model 2). Table 5-2 
reports the panel regression results for my stock funding (Model 3) and unfunded 
liabilities model (Model 4). In each table, the first and third columns report the 
estimated pooled OLS coefficients while the fixed effects coefficient estimates are listed 
in the second and fourth columns.  I use the unbiased and consistent FE estimates for 
inference while the OLS coefficients serve as a point of reference to compare my results 
to the existing empirical public pension literature - the majority of which relied on 
pooled OLS models to evaluate pension funding.  Year dummies are included in all 
model specifications and coefficient results are reported with clustered standard errors 
at the state level and robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and serial (within-
panel) correlation.   
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Table 5-1. Estimated Coefficients of Fixed Effects: Employer Contribution Rates and Flow 
Funding (100 State DB Plans, FY 2002-2010) 
  Model 1: Employer 
Contribution Rate (%ACP) 
  
Model 2: Flow Funding % 
(AC/ARC) 
  OLS Fixed Effects   OLS Fixed Effects 
ln Plan Net Assets -0.672 ** 6.880 **  -3.518 ** 31.135 ** 
 (0.322)  (3.035)   (1.532)  (15.363)  
Member contribution  -0.245 ** -0.092   -0.470  -0.535  
   rate (%ACP) (0.108)  (0.101)   (0.478)  (0.637)  
ln Average retirement  1.720 ** -0.854   8.181 ** 9.151  
   benefit payment (0.831)  (0.609)   (4.025)  (7.050)  
Actives/Beneficiaries  -0.033  0.037   -1.057 *** -0.529 ** 
   ratio (0.023)  (0.035)   (0.146)  (0.230)  
1-yr investment rate  -0.020  -0.035 *  -0.253 ** -0.302 ** 
   of return (%) (0.019)  (0.018)   (0.104)  (0.125)  
Discount rate (%) -3.109 ** -1.511   -14.294 ** 0.889  
 (1.539)  (1.027)   (5.813)  (6.268)  
Stock funding ratio (%) -0.158 *** 0.039   -0.032  0.367  
 (0.053)  (0.051)   (0.124)  (0.236)  
Annual required  0.395 ** 0.530 ***  -0.758 *** 0.077  
   contribut'n rate (%ACP) (0.154)  (0.123)   (0.189)  (0.334)  
percap unres GenFund  0.163 *** 0.281 ***  0.646  1.028 *** 
   balance ($1000s) (0.059)  (0.030)   (0.406)  (0.224)  
R2 0.419         0.118       
rho   0.742     0.750  
R2  within group   0.247     0.078  
R2  between group   0.017     0.003  
R2  overall group   0.044     0.000  
F-test of joint significance 58.606  335.942   33.625  60.063  
Notes: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
• ACP: annual covered payroll; Flow funding is the flow funding ratio (%), defined as the ratio of 
actual employer contributions (AC) to annual required contributions (ARC); Stock funding ratio (%), 
defined as the ratio of actuarial value of assets (AVA) to actuarial accrued liabilities (AAL); percap 
unres GenFund balance is state per capita unreserved general fund balance. AC, ARC, & ACP are all 
expressed in thousand dollars ($1000s). 
• Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in the brackets below the 
coefficient results; "rho" is the share of the estimated variance of the overall error accounted for by 
the individual plan effect. All panel regression models include year dummies whose estimated 
coefficients are not reported in this table due to space considerations but can be found in Appendix 
A. 
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Table 5-2. Estimated Regression Model Coefficients: Stock Funding and Unfunded 
Actuarial Accrued Liabilities (100 State DB Plans, FY 2002-2010) 
  Model 3: Stock Funding 
(AVA/AAL) % 
  
Model 4: Unfunded Actuarial 
Accrued Liabilities (%ACP) 
  OLS Fixed Effects   OLS Fixed Effects 
ln Plan Net Assets 2.764 ** 25.906 ***  5.726  -30.782  
 (1.288)  (7.344)   (7.536)  (33.408)  
Member contribution  -1.045 *** -0.681   2.252  -3.320  
   rate (%ACP) (0.366)  (0.494)   (2.027)  (4.073)  
ln Average retirement  -1.702  4.012   -17.440  21.195  
   benefit payment (3.200)  (3.161)   (26.191)  (17.646)  
1-yr investment rate of  0.055  -0.083 **  -1.183 ** -0.917 * 
   return (%) (0.040)  (0.033)   (0.519)  (0.477)  
Discount rate (%) -4.195  6.941   9.538  -10.338  
 (3.673)  (4.220)   (6.823)  (14.852)  
Actives/Beneficiaries  0.608 *** -0.321 ***  -0.173  -1.406 *** 
   ratio (0.129)  (0.099)   (0.239)  (0.467)  
Employer contribution  -0.714 *** 0.041 *  0.020  -1.203 *** 
  rate (%ACP) (0.159)  (0.023)   (0.849)  (0.125)  
Made ARC dummy 7.132 *** 1.466 *  -9.980  0.110  
 (1.860)  (0.751)   (8.093)  (3.786)  
percap unres GenFund  -0.086  -0.021   2.188 *** 2.700 *** 
   balance ($1000s) (0.233)  (0.060)   (0.745)  (0.509)  
R2 0.445         0.063       
rho   0.973     0.381  
R2  within group   0.571     0.071  
R2  between group   0.041     0.039  
R2  overall group   0.057     0.001  
F-test of joint significance 44.076   184.867     52.407   82.590   
Notes: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
• stock: stock funding ratio (%),defined as the ratio of actuarial value of assets (AVA) to actuarial 
accrued liabilities (AAL); uaal_acp: unfunded actuarial accrued liability expressed as a percentage of 
annual covered payroll (ACP), where UAAL=AAL-AVA; Employer contribution rate (%ACP); made_arc: 
dummy variable = 1 if plan made 100% annual required contribution (ARC); percap unres GenFund 
balance is state per capita unreserved general fund balance ($1000s).  
• Model 4 dependent variable is first-differenced to eliminate the unit-root. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the state level are reported in the brackets below the coefficient results; "rho" is the 
share of the estimated variance of the overall error accounted for by the individual plan effect. All 
panel regression models include year dummies whose estimated coefficients are not reported in this 
table due to space considerations but can be found in Appendix B. 
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To confirm the appropriateness of using the FE estimator, I calculated the t-statistic 
from the correlation between the individual plan effect and the fitted values and its 
standard error for each fixed effects regression model.29 For all four models, the results 
indicate that the random effects were highly correlated with the independent variables 
(i.e., the errors are correlated with the regressors) which would have yielded 
inconsistent OLS and RE estimates. 
Due to the time-series nature of my study’s dependent variables, non-stationarity in 
panel data is also a concern as it results in invalid hypothesis testing of OLS and FE 
coefficient estimates. I test for unit roots in the panel data for all four dependent 
variables and find that the stationarity assumption does not hold for the uaal_acp 
variable. I address this issue by taking the first-difference of uaal_acp and using its 
transformed version as my dependent variable for Model 4.30 
Defined Benefit State Pension Employer Contributions 
To test the hypothesis that the state pension plan sponsors in my sample were 
consistently underfunding their annual employer contributions, I examine the 
relationship between ARC and the actual employer contribution rate (Model 1) and flow 
funding ratio (Model 2). An increase in the annual required contribution rate is expected 
to be directly related to the employer contribution rate but inversely related to the flow 
funding ratio.  
The FE coefficient estimate for ARC was highly significant in Model 1 but was not 
statistically significant in Model 2. The results indicate that on average holding 
everything else constant, a percentage point increase in the annual required 
contribution rate results in a 0.53 percentage point increase in the actual employer 
                                                     
29 The t-stat calculated for each model is as follows: Model 1 (- 0.699/0.033)=-20.96; Model 2 (-
0.882/0.033)=-26.42; Model 3 (-0.863/0.033)=-25.86; and Model 4 (-0.617 /0.033)=-18.48. 
30 The following is the inverse chi-squared (d.f. = 200) statistic result from the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test using a lag structure of one for each dependent variable:  ac_acp 
(Model 1)=305.6; flow (Model 2)=618.52; stock (Model 3)=272.60 ; and uaal_acp (Model 
4)=233.99. A Phillips-Perron unit root test also confirmed non-stationarity in the uaal_acp 
variable. 
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contribution rate.  This finding is important because the arc_acp variable encapsulates 
the actuarial valuation process into one indicator as to what is required of the plan 
sponsor in the immediate/short-term funding period to maintain overall plan solvency.  
As noted in Chapter 2, Keeping up with funding requirements was the first of five 
identified categories of public pension policy reform efforts. The ideal policy response 
would be a 1:1 increase between the ARC and the employer contribution rate. The 
actual employer contribution response as implied by the results, somewhat follows Yang 
and Mitchell (2005) who assert that public pension plan sponsors fundamentally exhibit 
a “behavioral persistence” in underfunding contributions where, “…on average, public 
plans do make an effort to fill in an underfunding gap over time, though not fully from 
one year to the next” (p. 16).   
The following variables were significant predictors of employer contribution rates 
and flow funding ratios: the logarithm of plan net assets (ln_netasset); the one-year rate 
of return on investments (historicalret), and per capita unreserved General Fund 
balance (gfbal_urpc1k).  The ratio of active members to beneficiaries (actret) was 
statistically significant for flow funding ratio alone. 
I find a positive significant relationship between the size of a plan’s net assets and 
the employer contribution rate and flow funding ratio. This finding implies that sponsors 
of plans with more net assets are able to contribute more and are better able to fund 
their required contributions. Interestingly, the sign of the FE coefficients in Models 1 
and 2 flip from positive to negative when estimated with OLS. The significant but 
counterintuitive OLS results follows a similar negative relationship reported by Munnell 
et al. (2008d) between total plan assets and the likelihood of a plan making 100 percent 
of its ARC payment. The dramatic sign flip between the OLS and FE estimates with 
respect to the effect of total plan net assets on employer contribution efforts illustrates 
the bias that may arise from ignoring unobservable plan specific heterogeneity.  
In contrast, the intuition underlying the signs of the FE coefficient estimate for the 
effect of historicalret on ac_acp and flow remains fairly consistent even when estimated 
under OLS. The results imply that an increase in the one-year rate of return is associated 
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with a lower employer contribution rate and flow funding ratio. The result could be 
interpreted in two ways. Because the bulk of annual pension revenues come from 
investment returns, an improved investment performance should translate into a 
favorable funding situation where the plan sponsor may not be required to contribute 
as much as it would have otherwise. Alternatively, the favorable investment 
performance inclines the plan sponsor to assume similar future trends. Hence, the plan 
sponsor finds it acceptable to reduce its actual employer contribution because it 
assumes future investment returns will make up for any contribution shortfall. In a 
review of the pension funding literature, the only study to specify the investment rate of 
return as a determinant of flow funding was Yang and Mitchell (2005), and they found 
no statistically significant relationship between the two variables.    
For the active to retiree ratio variable (actret), the results from my panel regression 
analysis indicates that variable had no significant effect on the employer contribution 
rate. In the flow funding model though, coefficient estimates for actret variable were 
relatively robust, as both OLS and FE estimates show an increase in the proportion of 
active employees relative to beneficiaries is associated with lower funding ratios ceteris 
paribus. It may be that plan sponsors view the relationship between the employee 
composition ratio and the exigency of their contribution obligations in temporal terms. 
In other words, benefits earned by active employees are perceived as future obligations, 
whereas having a greater proportion of retirees equates to more immediate funding 
obligations since these are current liabilities that require paying off sooner rather than 
later. 
The coefficient for the per capita unreserved general fund balance variable 
(gfbal_urpc1k) suggests higher employer contribution rates and flow funding ratios are 
associated with state pension plans administered by states that record larger 
unreserved general fund balances. The results are robust to both OLS and FE 
specifications of the employer contribution rate model (Model 1) and provide empirical 
support for the positive effect that state fiscal condition has on public pension 
contributions. The result in Model 2 is consistent with the fiscal stress theme in the 
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pension funding literature that show a positive association between favorable fiscal 
conditions and the ability of state employers to contribute more into their funds. The 
most recent example is from Munnell et al. (2008d, 2011c) who find that a higher debt 
to GSP ratio makes it less likely that a plan sponsor pays the full ARC. 
The coefficient result from the assumed rate of return (assumedret) was only 
significant in the OLS specifications of employer contribution and flow funding. The OLS 
result is consistent with Chaney et al. (2002) and Eaton and Nofsinger (2004) who 
suggest public pension plan sponsors have an incentive to assume a higher discount rate 
in order to lower contribution requirements. My results on the other hand show that 
once we control for plan fixed effects, there is no evidence that the discount rate affects 
the actual employer contribution rate, or that it further influences the public plan 
sponsor’s tendency to underfund its required contribution. 
Overall Funded Status of State Defined Benefit Pension Plans 
In the second part of my empirical analysis, I examine the effect of the following 
explanatory variables on plan stock-funding ratio (Model 3: stock) and unfunded 
liabilities (Model 4: uaal_acp) respectively:  
 logarithm of average benefit payments (lnaveben)  
 employer contribution rate (ac_acp)  
 indicator variable whether full ARC payment was made (made_arc)   
 one-year rate of return on investments (historicalret)  
 plan member contribution rate (memcon_acp)  
 
Based on the asset-liability framework in Chapter 3, holding plan membership and 
assets constant, an increase in the average cost of retirement benefit payments is 
expected to be associated with lower stock funding ratios and higher unfunded pension 
liabilities. I fail to find any empirical support for this hypothesis with non-significant FE 
and OLS coefficient results for lnaveben in both Model 3 and 4 (see Table 5-1). This 
result complements Giertz and Papke (2007) who use a three year panel dataset of 85 
state pension plans to examine various retirement benefit variables plans and found no 
statistically significant effect on stock funding ratio as well. To date, the pension funding 
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literature has not provided the empirical support for the widespread anecdotal 
argument that benefit generosity and unfunded benefit enhancements contributed to 
the pension funding crisis.  
The FE coefficients for employer contribution rate (ac_acp) are statistically 
significant and yield the expected sign in both the stock funding model (Model 3) and 
uaal_acp (Model 4).  The results indicate that raising the employer contribution rate 
increases the plan’s stock funding ratio and reduces its uaal_acp.  The significant and 
positive relationship between the coefficient of the full ARC payment dummy variable 
(made_arc) and stock funding ratio underscores the importance of fulfilling required 
employer contributions. Simply put, the coefficient estimates for both variables (ac_acp 
and made_arc), suggest that when the plan sponsor contributes more, one can expect 
some improvement in a plan’s overall funded status.  
I compare my results with the relevant empirical literature: Doyle (2005) who 
examined the relationship between ac_acp and stock; and Coggburn and Kearney (2010) 
who examined the relationship between ac_acp and state per capita unfunded pension 
liabilities using aggregated state-level data for FY 2007. The Pooled OLS analysis by 
Doyle (2005) indicated ac_acp was negatively associated with stock, which is the same 
inference I get from my OLS coefficient result in Model 3.  Doyle does not explain why 
his finding contradicts his own hypothesis that ac_acp should be positively affect stock. 
From an econometric standpoint, the OLS results in this case exemplifies the concern 
over making erroneous inferences on the various pension funding relationships if we fail 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity between the different public pension plans. As 
for the relationship between ac_acp and state per capita UAAL, Coggburn and Kearney 
(2010) found a percentage point increase in ac_acp was associated with a 123.84 dollar 
increase in the per capita UAAL variable. The issue with their result though, is that they 
frame the direction of causality from UAAL to ac_acp in their hypothesis, but in their 
empirical model, they assume the opposite causal direction, ac_acp as a determinant of 
UAAL. In short, Coggburn and Kearney inadvertently and implicitly convey the 
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endogenous funding relationship between ac_acp and UAAL but fail to acknowledge or 
address it econometrically. 
Investment returns make up the largest proportion of pension revenues, therefore, 
a higher rate of return is expected to raise a pension plan’s stock funding ratio and 
reduce its unfunded liabilities. The estimated coefficient for the actual one year of 
return on investments (historicalret) was statistically significant for both stock funding 
(Model 3) and uaal_acp (Model 4) but did not display the expected sign in Model 3.  My 
FE coefficient results on the impact of investment returns on stock funding differs from 
the OLS results of Yang and Mitchell (2005) who found a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the two variables.  
I am uncertain as to why investment returns do not have the expected effect on 
stock funding, but as postulated earlier, the common actuarial practice of public pension 
of smoothing out investment returns may be contributing to this result. Some of that 
effect may be reflected in the trends we observe for the stock funding line graph (Figure 
4-1) and the line graph of the annual rate of return (Figure 4-4). It could be that the 
effects of the market downturn in 2001-2001 at the beginning of my sample period 
were still being incorporated into the stock funding values up to FY 2007, after which 
both historicalret and stock trended downwards in the same direction. Another possible 
explanation for the inverse relationship of historicalret and stock comes from the results 
in Table 5-1 that suggest an inverse relationship between historicalret and employer 
contribution behavior. Thus, any gains from investment returns, whose impact is already 
smoothed out over several periods, were further offset by lower employer contribution 
levels.  
The non-significant coefficients for employee contribution rate (memcon_acp) in 
both FE regression model specifications raise the question over the extent that raising 
plan member employee contributions is an effective strategy for improving a plan’s 
overall funded status.  A review of the descriptive statistics of my panel dataset confirms 
the relatively fixed nature of the employee contribution rate variable (memcon_acp) as 
indicated by the small within group variation (variation over time for each individual 
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plan) of the variable, much of which stems from employee contribution rates being 
defined by statute or determined under collective bargaining (GAO, 2008; Peng, 2008). 
Apart from the legal constraints to raising member contribution rates, vested public 
pension plan members tend to resist any proposed increases in their contributions just 
as robustly as they would any reductions to their benefits as was nationally played out 
in Wisconsin (Cogan, 2011; Ferrara, 2012; Walsh, 2011). It is unremarkable then that the 
majority of pension reforms enacted to raise employee contribution rates have largely 
been limited to newer employee cohorts (Pew Center, 2012).  
Although not the primary focus of my empirical evaluation, the estimated 
coefficients of the control variables specified for Models 3 and 4 provide additional 
insights into state DB retirement system funding. Starting with the discount rate variable 
(assumedret), it was noted in previous chapters how the actuarial values of plan assets 
and liabilities are sensitive to the choice of the discount rate. Nonetheless, the 
estimated coefficient for assumedret was not statistically significant in any of the model 
specifications. I partly ascribe this to the plans in my sample rarely changing their 
discount rate assumptions during the sample period, and this was also reflected in the 
small within-group variation for the variable.  
More unclear is the sign of the estimated coefficient for the ratio of active members 
to retirees variable (actret). I expected a positive correlation between actret and stock 
as both followed a similar downward trend over the sample period with the cross-
sectional sample mean for actret steadily decreasing every year from a ratio of 3.52 in 
FY 2002 to 1.98 in FY 2010. Past studies have shown a direct relationship between the 
actret variable and stock funding (Eaton & Nofsinger, 2008; Giertz & Papke, 2007). It 
was hypothesized that having more active employee members relative to retired 
beneficiaries leads to a more favorable funding outcome due to greater revenue inflows 
from more member contributions relative to cash benefit payment outflows. My 
estimated FE coefficients for actret seem to infer contradictory results when Model 3 
and Model 4 are considered together. Though Model 4 shows the expected inverse 
relationship between actret and uaal_acp, the estimated coefficient in Model 3 
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indicates an inverse relationship between actret and stock that contradicts both my own 
hypothesis and the extant literature.  
It could be that a greater share of the actuarial value of plan liabilities is coming 
from the benefits accruing to active employees. It follows from the accrual accounting 
of liabilities, the denominator in the stock funding measure includes the benefits 
accrued by active employees and not just the retirement benefits paid out to current 
retirees.  Another possible reason for the negative effect of actret on stock builds on the 
statistically significant inverse relationship between actret and flow obtained from 
estimating Model 2 (see Table 5-1). Assuming a direct relationship exists between stock 
and flow (albeit the unclear direction of causality), then the effect of actret on flow 
serves as the indirect link to explain the significant effect of actret on stock.  
The estimated coefficient for gfbal_urpc1k also produced mixed results in Models 3 
and 4. If we take the results from Models 1 and 2, the estimated coefficient for 
gfbal_urpc1k indicated a positive and statistically significant relationship with employer 
contribution behavior both in terms of the nominal rate and flow funding ratio. Thus, we 
expect gfbal_urpc1k to be positively related to stock and inversely related to uaal_acp. 
Instead, I find that the coefficient for gfbal_urpc1k was significant only in the model for 
unfunded liability, and did not yield the expected sign.  The results were robust to both 
OLS and FE specifications and implied gfbal_urpc1k is positively related to uaal_acp.  In 
reviewing the general trend for both variables in my panel data set, I find that state 
general fund balance increased six out of the nine years in my sample period while 
uaal_acp was steadily increasing over the same period. So while the association 
between the two variables is apparent, the causal link is unclear. At this point, further 
investigation is needed to determine why the unfunded pension liability would increase 
for states that record a favorable fiscal condition such as an increase in the general fund 
balance.  
As for the non-significant effect of gfbal_urpc1k on stock, the result undermines the 
use of my analytical framework in explaining the relationship between actret and stock 
by using the effect of actret on flow as the indirect causal link. In this case though, 
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whereas actret is a variable that factors in both short-term (flow) and long-term (stock) 
actuarial calculations, gfbal_urpck1k is an exogenous non-actuarial factor. In other 
words, the plan sponsor only considers current state budgetary conditions as reflected 
in the unreserved general fund balance at the time it determines its level of employer 
contributions. Again, just as with actret, further research is needed to determine why 
differing and unexpected results are obtained for the effect of gfbal_urpc1k on stock 
and uaal_acp.31 
Discussion 
In this chapter, I reported and discussed the estimated coefficient results from my 
panel regression models of four DB state pension plan funding outcomes, namely: the 
employer contribution rate, flow funding ratio, stock funding ratio, and the relative size 
of plan unfunded liabilities. The results were discussed in relation to my hypotheses on 
funding relationships and outcomes for those pension reform categories concerned with 
increasing employee and employer contributions and reducing retirement benefit 
payments.  First, the results of my analysis indicate a statistically significant relationship 
between employer contribution behavior and DB pension plan funding outcomes along 
with evidence of the degree to which state government DB plan sponsors were 
underfunding their annual required contribution requirements. Second, the results call 
into question the potential effectiveness of reforms related to increasing employee 
contributions and reducing retirement benefit payment reductions. I found that changes 
in the employee contribution rate and the size of the average retirement benefit 
payment had no statistically effect on overall plan funded status. Taken together, the 
evidence underlines the fiduciary burden that states carry as sponsors of their 
respective DB retirement systems. Since employee contribution rates and retirement 
benefit payments are relatively fixed due to the legal protections afforded them, 
                                                     
31 Regression models using lagged values of selected explanatory and control variables were also 
examined and yielded similar results. The only notable exception was the significant positive 
effect of lagged gfbal_urpc1k on flow funding. Overall, the alternative model specifications did 
not provide any substantial differences in the overall conclusions of the empirical analysis. 
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employer contributions become the primary recourse for states in covering funding 
shortfalls that occur from dismal investment returns (Young, 2010). Even though an 
increasing number of states are moving to increase employee contribution rates and 
reduce the generosity of retirement benefits, the actuarial impact is expected to be 
negligible as long as efforts are limited to new and future employee cohorts (GAO, 
2012a). 
Apart from the contribution and benefit payment variables, I also found empirical 
support from the results in Model 4 that plans with higher investment returns and a 
higher plan membership ratio of active employees to retirees are associated with lower 
unfunded liabilities. As noted earlier, among the host of issues debated over public 
pension funding, the size of the unfunded liabilities has received the most attention. The 
results carry important implications in two policy areas for states trying to reduce if not 
control the growth in unfunded pension liabilities. First, the overarching share of plan 
assets sourced from investment income drives the efforts to continuously seek ways to 
improve investment performance by linking it to governance reforms. Second, state 
governments are dealing with the myriad consequences of a rapidly aging and retiring 
workforce (Lewis & Cho, 2011; Toosi, 2012). This trend is manifesting itself in the 
membership composition of state retirement systems where the ratio of retired to 
active plan members is growing (Becker-Medina, 2011). We could expect a diminishing 
percentage share of annual revenues from employee contributions. Moreover, states 
face an increasing fiscal burden not just from having to close the funding gap for future 
liabilities, but having to pay out retirement benefits in the current year.  
Endogeneity of Public Pension Funding 
Though not the focus of my hypotheses testing, I was unable to provide a clear 
explanation for the unexpected sign of the statistically significant coefficient results for 
historicalret and actret in the stock funding model.  Instead, I proposed a partial 
explanation for the inverse relationship of both variables with stock funding by referring 
to the inverse relationship that both variables had with employer contribution behavior 
in both cases. By using employer contribution behavior as the link to explain the non-
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intuitive results in the stock funding model for historicalret and actret, my results 
suggest endogeneity in employer contribution behavior. The endogeneity stems from 
the dynamic adjustments that the plan sponsor is making in terms of its employer 
contribution in response to the changes in other plan level characteristics and funding 
components. Based on this supposition, the appropriateness of evaluating stock funding 
in a static framework then becomes a concern. This is because traditional fixed effects 
approach my control for the endogeneity from the unobserved plan-specific 
heterogeneity, but it does not account for the endogeneity arising from the dynamic 
adjustments occurring in the pension funding process. Therefore, an empirical 
evaluation within a dynamic framework could therefore yield clearer insights into the 
public pension funding process. 
Using an abstract example to illustrate this point, consider my two-period model of 
an underfunded DB plan illustrated in Figure 3-1 where the state government fails to 
make the full ARC payment in the first period.  In reality, the actual DB funding process 
is more complicated as it involves a multi-period, year-round, ongoing, simultaneous 
flow of employer and employee contributions into the fund and retirement benefits 
paid out of the fund to plan beneficiaries.  Broadly summarized, a state DB plan is a 
dynamic and multi-faceted system where investments are managed year-round and 
different sets of employee cohorts with multiple salary grade levels enter, leave, or get 
promoted. From the plan actuary’s perspective, an actuarial valuation of plan assets and 
liabilities from where the stock funding ratio and unfunded liability measure is 
calculated, involves regularly updating actuarial projections, and accounting for multiple 
investment horizons (a function of the investment portfolio) and different amortization 
periods (e.g., whether closed or open).  
A review of state and pension plan CAFRs show that in practice a time lag exists in 
the valuation and financial reporting of stock and flow-funding components. Using my 
two-period model example in Figure 3-1, I illustrate how this time lag becomes a source 
of endogeneity for both stock and flow funding measures. First, let us assume 
investment returns and employee contributions in current year t are exogenous revenue 
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sources for current year assets. This leaves the third source of revenues, current year 
actual employer contributions (AC) observed in year t. As the results reported in Table 
5-1 indicates, AC is a function of the actuarially determined annual required 
contribution (ARC) levels. We know by definition, ARC in turn is derived from the value 
of assets and liabilities accrued (stock) from all periods prior to current year t, and that 
both AC and ARC are components of the flow funding ratio (i.e., how the plan sponsors 
responds to ARC in terms of its AC). Thus, by construction, flow funding is endogenously 
determined. It follows then, that stock funding is endogenously determined since we 
showed how past stock funding levels can affect current stock funding levels through 
current employer contribution behavior.  
Apart from employer contributions, if we consider that investment returns largely 
determine stock funding, and if the assumption from the public pension literature holds 
that governance practices influence investment performance (e.g., board directed 
investment and asset-allocation policies), then it becomes even more clear how the 
stock funding ratio, as an indicator of the overall funded status of a plan, is effectively 
endogenously determined as well. 
The paper by Yang and Mitchell (2005) is the only previous study to raise the issue in 
general of endogeneity in public pension funding, where the positive correlation 
between current and past stock funding ratios is traced to the endogeneity of 
investment performance and persistence in overall pension funding levels. Their paper 
postulated that endogeneity arises from flow funding being determined by stock 
funding, and in turn, stock funding being determined by investment performance, with 
investment performance endogenously determined by the governance practices 
implemented. To model the possibility that current plan past plan funding outcomes 
influence current funding, Yang and Mitchell include a lagged dependent variable in 
their pooled OLS regression model of public pension plan stock funding ratios. Their 
results suggested that a 1-percentage point increase in the stock funding ratio in a given 
year was associated with a 0.76 percentage point increase the following year in the 
stock funding ratio. The authors explain that Mitchell and Smith’s (1994) behavioral 
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persistence hypothesis of public pension plan underfunding is partly explained by the 
lack of regulations requiring public plan sponsors to fulfill their funding obligations. The 
modeling approach by Yang and Mitchell (2005) essentially extends the static pension 
funding model expressed in eq.4-1 to take the following general form: 
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝜿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑪𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡                             (eq. 5-1) 
 
For parsimony in notation, we denote fundingi,t as yi,t and combine ki,t and Ci,t into 
Xi,t, and where μi,t = i + i,t , to write a more general form of the dynamic model in eq. 
5-1 and express it as: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                 (eq. 5-2) 
 
Where yi,t is the plan’s funding ratio for plan i in year t; Xi,t is the matrix of time-
variant explanatory variables that affect plan funding as specified in eq. 4-4, and μi,t is 
the composite error consisting of the plan fixed effect i, and the random error term i,t 
where 𝑖,𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎
2). While Yang and Mitchell claim the endogeneity issue is addressed 
through the use of panel data and inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in their 
regression model, their use of a pooled OLS estimator failed to address the endogeneity 
due to unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. 
Econometrically, unobservable heterogeneity exists in Eq. 5-2 if E(ηi|Xi,t) ≠ 0. As 
applied to public pension funding, unobserved heterogeneity becomes a source of 
endogeneity if there are plan specific characteristics or factors that affect both stock 
funding and explanatory variables (i.e., unobserved determinants are correlated with 
the observables).  Some examples of time-invariant state DB plan related variables that 
may affect the various stock funding components include actuarial valuation methods 
and employer sponsorship arrangements that exist for each plan. In our panel setting, 
no matter how many plan-specific factors we may include in our regressor list, that is, 
the right hand side of our regression equation, there may be some time-invariant 
characteristics unique to each plan that affects the plan’s funding outcome that we fail 
to account for. Omission of these variables will result in biased estimates. 
As for simultaneity, econometrically this occurs in eq. 5-2 if E(εi,t|Xi,t) ≠ 0. Applied to 
public pension funding, simultaneity exists when there is some feedback relationship 
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between one or more independent variables and the stock funding variable (i.e., the 
explanatory variables is jointly determined with the dependent variable). It could be the 
case of bidirectional causality, or reverse causality, or that both variables are 
simultaneously observed. For example, if we take the behavioral persistence hypothesis 
of Mitchell and Smith (1994) that places the direction of causality from stock funding to 
flow funding, then by construction, ceteris paribus, having more assets relative to 
liabilities results in a lower ARC; making it more likely that the plan sponsor becomes 
better able to contribute the full ARC payment.  Equally conceivable though, is if the 
plan sponsor is delinquent in meeting its full employer contribution, this would lower 
the flow-funding ratio, and therefore negatively affect the stock-funding ratio. 
Going back to eq. 5-2, if we follow Yang and Mitchell (2005) and apply simple OLS to 
estimate the dynamic model with a lagged dependent variable, this will lead to 
inconsistent and biased results in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (Baltagi, 
2008). This is because by construction, yi,t is a function of the fixed effect ηi, it follows 
that the lagged dependent variable yi,t-1, is also a function of the fixed effect i and thus, 
correlated with the error term μi,t . The correlation does not go away even if we increase 
the number of individuals n in the sample or sample time periods T (Bond, 2002). One 
can also show that the correlation between yi,t-1 and the fixed effect in i inflates or 
biases upwards δ1 the coefficient of yi,t-1 (Lachenmaier & Rottmann 2011). 
To eliminate the plan-specific effects ηi in our panel data, the standard approach is 
to apply the fixed effects estimator as I did with my static models to obtain a demeaned 
estimation equation. The consistency and unbiasedness of the FE estimator though 
relies on a strict exogeneity assumption that current values of both the dependent and 
explanatory variables are independent of their past realizations. The inclusion of Yi,t-1 
violates this assumption. Hsiao (2003; section 4.2) and Wintoki et al. (2012) show how 
applying fixed-effects estimation in the presence of a dynamic relationship results in 
biased and inconsistent estimates. Even after removing the panel level means, the 
transformed variables on the right hand side of eq. 5-2 will still be correlated with the 
demeaned error term ( 𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?). Lachenmaier and Rottmann (2011) show how this 
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leads to a downward bias in the estimates of the lagged dependent variable. Even if 
more regressors are included and the errors are not serially correlated, purging the 
individual plan effects will not eliminate the dynamic panel bias; it essentially makes 
every observation of the transformed y endogenous to the error (Nickel, 1981). Only 
when T , the fixed-effects estimator is consistent in a dynamic panel model, which is 
typically not the case in most panel data sets where T is fixed or relatively small (Bond 
2002).  A review of the empirical public pension funding literature shows Giertz and 
Papke (2007), Doyle (2005), and Listokin (2007) were the only previous researchers to 
apply the FE estimator in their respective panel regression models of stock funding. 
However, all the empirical analyses were carried out within a static framework; none of 
the researchers specified a lagged dependent variable in their respective regression 
equations.  
Fortunately, the development of several panel regression models provides us with 
solutions to with the econometric issues that may arise from estimating a dynamic panel 
model such as that specified in eq. 5-2. In the next chapter, I describe and implement an 
empirical strategy that uses the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework for 
evaluating the dynamic adjustments in DB public pension funding. 
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CHAPTER 6  
 
A DYNAMIC EMPIRICAL MODEL OF PENSION PLAN FUNDING 
 
 
In Chapter 5, I presented and discussed the results of my state DB pension funding 
panel regression models. The Fixed Effects (FE) estimator was identified as the 
appropriate empirical strategy to control for time-invariant differences between the 
individual plans in my panel dataset. OLS estimates were also presented to provide 
comparable results from past studies that may have failed to properly account for the 
endogeneity arising from unobserved heterogeneity. While the FE estimator 
ameliorates the omitted variable bias, it does so at the expense of a strong exogeneity 
assumption that current year values of my model’s explanatory variables are completely 
independent of the past values of the dependent stock funding variable. This is an 
assumption I argued is unrealistic if we consider the dynamic adjustments that occur in 
the pension funding process. 
This chapter builds on the discussion from the end of the last chapter by examining 
the relationship between employer funding behavior and its effect on the overall 
funding levels of state DB pension plans within a dynamic framework. The purpose of 
this chapter is to outline an empirical strategy that demonstrates the use of a 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in estimating a dynamic panel model of state DB 
plan stock funding ratios. To provide an empirical perspective on the need to consider 
the dynamic nature of public pension funding, I discuss the results in relation to those 
obtained from my FE panel regression model of stock funding in Chapter 5.  
State DB Pension Funding as a Dynamic Process 
Endogeneity, as it relates to dynamic adjustments in public pension funding, is 
scarcely addressed in the literature. To show conceptually how stock funding and flow 
funding are endogenously determined, I use the behavioral persistence hypothesis of 
public pension funding by Mitchell and Smith (1994) as a starting framework. As earlier 
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cited, this hypothesis predicts a positive unitary relationship between stock and flow 
funding, where the level of stock funding determines the level of flow funding. But as 
we also showed, current year flow funding, which essentially represents the plan 
sponsor’s employer contribution behavior, is endogenously determined because it 
occurs in response to ARC. ARC in turn, is a function of the previous year’s stock funding 
level. Given how the abovementioned funding outcomes are constructed, one can see 
how current year stock funding is affected by past values of stock funding through 
current year employer contributions. Consequently, our empirical strategy will have to 
deal not just with the endogeneity in public pension funding from unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity, but also the endogeneity that arises from the dynamic 
nature of the DB public pension funding process. 
Because applying OLS or Fixed Effects to estimate the dynamic model in eq. 5-2 
leads to biased and inconsistent results, a GMM panel estimator is used instead to 
examine the relationship between employer contributions and stock funding ratios. This 
estimator exploits the dynamic relationship between the dependent and independent 
pension funding variables in my model. The basic estimation procedure essentially 
consists of two parts (Wintoki et al., 2002). The first part relates to using first-
differencing to eliminate the fixed effects in the dynamic model in eq. 6-1 as first 
proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981), whereas the second part relates to the GMM 
estimator introduced in a series of papers that include Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano 
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Following the parsimonious approach to notation in eq. 5-2, we denote stocki,t in 
eq.6-1 as yi,t and all the RHS independent variables are indicated by Xi,t, and write a 
more general form of the dynamic model in eq.6-1 as: 
yi,t = α + δ(yi,t-1)+ β (Xi,t) + ηi + εi,t                           (eq. 6-1) 
 
Where α is the constant term and δ is the estimated coefficient of our lagged 
dependent variable. The first part of the estimation procedure is first-differencing both 
sides of eq.6-2 such that: 
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Dyi,t = α + δDyi,t-1+ β DXi,t + Dεi,t                           (eq. 6-2) 
 
The fixed effect i  has been eliminated, but yi,t-1 in yi,t-1 correlates with i,t-1 which 
is in i,t.; so, yi,t-1 is correlated with i,t  by construction. Taking an IV estimation 
approach, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) demonstrated that as long as i,t are not serially 
correlated, one can use two-stage least squares (2SLS) from further lags to construct 
valid instruments for the lagged dependent variable - either as level (e.g., yi,t-2) or 
difference (e.g., yi,t-2) for yi,t-1. Arellano and Bond (1991) show that while the 
estimator described by Anderson and Hsiao is unbiased and consistent, it is not the 
most efficient, because it uses only a limited subset of all possible values of the 
instrumental variables, and fails to take into account all the potential orthogonality 
conditions. The 2SLS as applied in Anderson-Hsiao’s “first-difference IV” estimator also 
creates a trade-off between the depth (i.e., number of time periods) of the estimation 
sample and the lag distance (i.e., number of lags) used to generate internal instruments 
(Roodman, 2009a).  
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) improve upon the IV 
estimation approach of Anderson and Hsiao (1981) by proposing a Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) framework to estimate eq. 6-2.  The Arellano-Bond estimator 
utilizes all available past values of the dependent variable when creating instruments for 
the lagged dependent variable without lag and sample depth tradeoff. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) constructed their estimator, otherwise referred to as Difference GMM, 
from moment conditions formed using lagged levels of yi,t, first-differenced errors, and 
the first differences of strictly exogenous variables.  Later work by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) showed weak instruments though affected the asymptotic and small-sample 
performance of the first-difference GMM estimator. When yi,t is close to a random walk 
(i.e., past levels provide little information about future changes), it renders the 
untransformed lags as weak instruments for transformed first-differenced variables.    
Blundell and Bond (1998), building on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995), 
augments the Arellano-Bond estimator by forming moment conditions using a system 
containing both first-differenced and levels equations.  When applied to my stock 
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funding ratio model, this estimation strategy utilizes the lagged differences of the 
endogenous stock and flow funding variables as instruments in the level equation (eq. 6-
2) and the lagged levels of the endogenous variables in the first-differenced equation 
(eq. 6-3), resulting in a “stacked” system of equations that includes equations in both 
levels and differences:  
 
[
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡
] = 𝛼 + 𝛿 [
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑝
Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑝
] + 𝛽 [
𝑿𝑖,𝑡
Δ𝑿𝑖,𝑡
] + 𝑖,𝑡 ,     p>0                                                (eq. 6-3) 
 
The estimated coefficients are then obtained by solving the appropriate weighted 
set of the moment conditions from eq. 6-1 and eq. 6-2.32 
Using Monte-Carlo simulations, Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that the system 
GMM (sGMM) estimator performed better than difference GMM in finite samples. 
Blundell and Bond (2000) further showed that exploiting the additional moment 
conditions in the levels equation improves the precision of sGMM estimates over 
difference GMM when the dependent variable is persistent. 
Both difference and system GMM can be applied in either one- or two-step variants 
with robust standard errors (Baum 2006). In difference GMM regressions on simulated 
panels, Windmeijer (2005) finds the two-step efficient GMM performs better than one-
step in estimating coefficients, with lower bias and standard errors. However, Monte 
Carlo studies such as those by Arellano and Bond (1991) have shown that the two-step 
estimates of both difference and system GMM standard errors are severely biased 
                                                     
32 In system GMM, additional moment conditions can be added for endogenous variables whose 
first-differences can be used as instruments (Cameron & Trivedi 2010). The moment conditions 
created by assuming particular lagged levels of the dependent and other endogenous variables 
are orthogonal to the differenced errors are sometimes referred to as “GMM” type moment 
conditions, whereas those formed using strictly exogenous variables are sometimes referred to 
as standard “IV-style” moment conditions (Roodman, 2009a). One can instrument the 
endogenous variable using the same principle for instrumenting the lagged dependent variable. 
For example, if an explanatory variable xi,t is endogenous, then valid instruments for xi,t in the 
first-differenced equation is xi,t-2 and earlier realizations of xi. Valid instruments for xi,t in the 
level equation is xi,t-1 and earlier realizations of xi,t.  
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downwards in small samples.33  To address the downward bias in sGMM errors, 
Windmeijer (2005) developed a small-sample correction to the covariance-matrix for 
two-step standard errors and reported that his correction resulted in more accurate 
standard errors; such that two-step estimation with the corrected errors appears 
modestly superior to robust one-step GMM (Roodman, 2009a). Given the factors that 
apply in my stock funding ratio model - short panel, a dynamic dependent variable, a 
lack of good external instruments, along with the ability to instrument potentially 
endogenous variables (e.g., ac_acp, made_arc) - the system GMM estimator offers a 
dynamic panel solution to the problems of endogeneity stemming from simultaneity 
bias, reverse causality, and omitted variables.   
A Dynamic Model of Stock Funding  
Following Yang and Mitchell (2005), I extend the static model expressed in Model 3 
(eq. 4-4) by including a lagged dependent variable to account for the possibility that a 
plan’s current overall funded status as indicated by the stock funding ratio is influenced 
by past stock funding outcomes:  
stocki,t = β0 + β1 (stocki,t-1)+ β2 (memcon_acpi,t) + β3 (lnavebeni,t)  
              + β4 (ac_acpi,t) + β5 (made_arci,t) + γCi,t + λTt + ηi + εi,t            (eq. 6-4) 
 
Where the dependent variable stocki,t is the plan’s stock funding ratio for plan i in 
year t; stocki,t-1 is the lagged dependent variable; memcon_acpi,t is the employee 
contribution rate expressed as a percentage of the annual covered payroll; lnavebeni,t is 
the logarithm of a plan’s average benefit payment. In this equation, both flow funding 
related variables, arc_acpi,t is the annual required contribution rate expressed as a 
percentage of annual covered payroll, and made_arci,t, a dummy variable to indicate 
whether the plan made its full annual required contribution. 
                                                     
33 One-step GMM estimators use weight matrices that are independent of estimated 
parameters, whereas the efficient two-step GMM estimator weighs the moment conditions by a 
consistent estimate of their covariance matrix (Windmeijer, 2005).  The term “two-step” also 
refers to the optimal weighting matrix constructed in the first-step estimation using an initial 
consistent estimate of the parameters in the model (Windmeijer, 2005).  
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The model shares the same set of control variables Ci,t  as those specified in Model 3 
from Chapter 5. These include actreti,t a control for plan member composition between 
active and retired plan members; assumedreti,t the selected discount rate used in the 
actuarial asset valuation; and historicalreti,t the one year actual rate of return on 
investments. Tt is a vector of year dummies to control for any shocks common to all 
state DB plans. Lastly, i is the unobserved plan fixed effect and i,t is the random error 
term.  
The model was fitted using the system GMM (sGMM) estimator by Arellano-Bover 
(1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) and implemented in STATA 12.1 using the xtabond2 
user written command by Roodman (2009a). The two-step sGMM coefficient results are 
reported in Table 6-1 using Windmeijer’s (2005) “finite-sample correction” to the robust 
standard errors, along with the FE estimates obtained from my stock funding model as 
reported in Table 5-2.   
The xtabond2 user command allows us to specify our endogenous variables as 
‘GMM’ style instruments and incorporate assumptions on which variables are strictly 
exogenous (i.e., standard `iv’ instruments). In this model, the stock funding ratio and 
both flow funding related variables arc_acpi,t and made_arci,t are assumed to be 
endogenous. So, for our GMM style instrument set, each of the three identified 
endogenous variables are instrumented using lagged values (i.e., lagged levels and 
lagged differences) up to year t-4, and the year dummies are identified as standard IV 
style instruments (i.e., treated as exogenous). To ensure the statistical validity of the 
instruments used, the results of the AR(2) and Hansen J test are also reported in Table 
6-1. 
Assessing the Specification of the GMM model 
The consistency of the GMM estimator will depend on the absence of serial 
correlation in the error term and the validity of the instruments. I use the Arellano-Bond 
test for autocorrelation to test the hypothesis that the idiosyncratic error i,t is not 
serially correlated.   
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Table 6-1. Fixed Effects and System GMM Model of Stock Funding Ratios (100 State DB 
Plans, FY 2002-2010) 
  Stock Funding (AVA/AAL) % 
  Fixed Effects   System GMM 
stockt-1    0.732 *** 
   (0.069)  
ln Plan Net Assets 25.906 ***  2.335 * 
(7.344)   (1.202)  
Member contribution rate (%ACP) -0.681   -0.561  
 (0.494)   (0.452)  
ln Average retirement benefit payment 4.012   -3.870  
    (3.161)   (3.944)  
1 yr investment rate of return (%) -0.083 **  0.509 *** 
    (0.033)   (0.151)  
Discount rate (%) 6.941   1.340  
 (4.220)   (3.106)  
Actives/Beneficiaries ratio -0.321 ***  1.645 ** 
    (0.099)   (0.673)  
Employer contribution rate (%ACP) 0.041 *  0.075 ** 
   (0.023)   (0.035)  
Made ARC dummy 1.466 *  1.745  
(0.751)   (1.086)  
percap unres GenFund balance ($1000s) -0.021   -0.172  
    (0.060)     (0.346)   
R2 0.571     
AR (1) test p-value     0.001  
AR (2) test p-value    0.607  
Hansen J-test p-value    0.543  
No. of instruments       111  
Notes: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01      
• stock: stock funding ratio (%),defined as the ratio of actuarial value of assets (AVA) to 
actuarial accrued liabilities (AAL); made_arc: dummy variable = 1 if plan made 100% annual 
required contribution (ARC); percap unres GenFund balance ($1000s): state per capita 
unreserved general fund balance 
• AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, where Ho: no serial correlation; Hansen test of over-identification 
where Ho: all instruments are valid. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are 
reported in the brackets below the fixed effects coefficient results while the two-step 
standard errors for the System GMM estimated values are robust to the Windmeijer (2005) 
correction for finite-sample heteroskedasticity. All panel regression models include year 
dummies whose estimated coefficients are not reported in this table but can be found in 
Appendix C. 
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By construction, we expect first-order serial correlation in differences since i,t is 
mathematically related to i,t-1 via the shared term i,t-1. Hence, we are interested in 
the result of the second-order correlation in differences between i,t-1 in i,t and i,t-2 in 
i,t-2. To test for this, Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend using the AR(2) 
autocorrelation test of the null hypothesis that there is no second-order autocorrelation 
in the residuals of the equation in differences. The AR(2) test yields a p-value of 0.607 
which means we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. 
Next, I use the robust Hansen (1982) J statistic test for overidentification to test the 
joint validity of the overidentifying restrictions on the GMM estimator. It is the most 
common diagnostic in GMM estimation used to assess the appropriateness of the model 
specification (Baum 2006).34 Rejecting the null hypothesis under this test implies the 
instruments do not meet the required orthogonality conditions – because either the 
instruments are not truly exogenous or they are being excluded incorrectly from the 
regression (Baum 2006). The results in Table 6-1 indicate a J-statistic with a p-value of 
0.543 and as such, we cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments are valid. 
Apart from testing the validity of the full instrument set (i.e. entire set of 
overidentifying restrictions), I also test the validity of a subsets of instruments (i.e., 
GMM style and standard IV style instruments) using the difference-in- Hansen test. The 
test, also referred to by Hayashi (2000) as the C-statistic, is distributed 𝒳2 with degrees 
of freedom equal to the loss of overidentifying restrictions under the null hypothesis 
that the specified variables are proper instruments (Baum et al., 2003). The results for 
these specification tests are reported in Appendix C and they confirm the statistical 
validity of my GMM and standard IV instruments. Appendix E provides a more detailed 
discussion of the system GMM model diagnostic and specification tests used in my 
analysis. 
                                                     
34 The Hansen J-Test is used instead of the Sargan Test since the distribution of the Sargan test is 
only known when the errors are independently and identically distributed. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) show that the one-step Sargan test over-rejects in the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, and a tendency to under-reject  when applied after the two-step estimator 
under the same conditions. 
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Results and Discussion 
A cursory review and comparison of the FE and sGMM coefficients reported in Table 
6-1 reveal some notable results. First, the highly significant sGMM coefficient of the 
stock funding lagged dependent variable confirms the importance of including it in the 
specification. Conversely, it also suggests omitted dynamics in any static empirical 
model specification. 
The sGMM estimates in Table 6-1 suggest that on average, holding everything else 
constant, that a 1-percentage point increase in the previous year’s stock funding ratio is 
associated with a 0.732 percentage point increase in the current year’s stock funding 
ratio. This result suggests past funding outcomes have a major influence in determining 
current and future plan funding outcomes.  
Conversely, when we consider the past research, the result implies a concern for 
omitted dynamics in any static model specification of stock funding ratios. Even apart 
from sGMM results, we get some indication of the importance of accounting for 
dynamics in pension funding by just looking at the changes in the R2 when we add the 
stock funding ratio lagged dependent variable to our FE and OLS models. The R2 rises 
from 0.445 in the static OLS model to 0.929 in the dynamic OLS model, and from 0.057 
in the static FE model to 0.417 in the dynamic FE model (see Table 6-1 and Appendix C).  
Additionally, in comparing the three dynamic model specifications in Appendix C, one 
would note that the estimated sGMM coefficient of the lagged dependent variable lies 
between the FE and OLS estimates, where FE_stockt-1< sGMM_stockt-1<OLS_stockt-1 
(0.591<0.732<0.939). This illustrates Bond’s (2002) discussion of how applying the FE 
estimator to a dynamic model would bias downwards estimated the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable, and upward biased when simple OLS is applied to a dynamic 
model. 
When the relationship between employer contribution behavior and overall plan 
funding is evaluated under the FE model, the results indicated that both flow funding 
related variables - the employer contribution rate ac_acp, and making the full ARC 
payment - were positively related to stock funding ratio.  In particular, the estimates for 
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ac_acp were particularly robust to both model specifications. The positive relationship 
between ac_acp and stock is even more pronounced under the sGMM model when we 
account for pension funding dynamics. The estimated coefficient for ac_acp goes from 
0.041 (p<0.10) under the FE model to 0.075 (p<0.05) under the sGMM model. The other 
flow related variable, made_arc, was only significant under the FE model (p<0.10) and 
not under the sGMM.  
After controlling for the endogeneity of both stock and flow funding treat 
instrumenting for the endogeneity of our flow funding related variables, the results 
suggest that how much the plan sponsor actually contributes into the plan affects 
overall funding levels matters more than whether the plan sponsor merely makes the 
full ARC payment.  This finding diverges from my hypothesis that ascribes the growing 
funding gap in DB state PERS to the recurring failure of states to contribute the full ARC, 
that is, where the flow funding ratio is less than 100%. So what might account for the 
non-significance of the made_arc variable? One possible reason is related to employer 
contribution policy and the nature of the variable itself. The funding policy norm for the 
majority of public pension plans is full payment of the actuarially determined ARC but at 
the same time, most states are not legally required to pay the full ARC every year (Peng 
2008).  
We know that from Munnell et al. (2008d, 2011c) that actuarial valuation method 
and state fiscal condition affect the likelihood that states make the full ARC payment. 
Both studies further add that anywhere from half to two-thirds of plans who failed to 
pay the full ARC, cite legal constraints (whether binding or non-binding) as the primary 
barrier to making the full contributions. Plan actuaries likely incorporate these factors 
into their annual valuations whenever they determine the future stream of ARC flows. If 
we take into context an objective of maintaining a certain level of funding, the 
assumption is that the plan sponsor consistently pays the full ARC each year moving 
forward. Holding all other plan funding variables constant, it follows then that whenever 
the plan sponsor fails to pay the full ARC for any given year, plan actuaries will re-adjust 
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or re-calculate their plan valuations based on the actual employer contribution rate 
(AC).  
As for the other two reform-linked funding components of interest in this study, 
memcon_acp and lnaveben, neither variable showed a significant relationship with stock 
funding ratio. The sGMM results would suggest that even after accounting for the 
dynamic adjustments in pension plan funding, increasing the employee contribution 
rate and reducing the size of average plan benefits on average ceteris paribus, might not 
have the intended policy reform impact of increasing a plan’s stock funding ratio. The 
results are fairly robust if we consider the same result is confirmed in the dynamic 
specifications of the OLS and FE model (see Appendix C).  
Taking an actuarial perspective, the practice of smoothing out investment returns to 
lessen the volatility of ARC rates ensures that the impact of annual investment returns 
and actual employer contribution rates gets spread over several periods. By contrast, 
employee contributions and benefit payouts represent single period shocks to plan 
funding levels. With employee contributions, the rates are relatively fixed and they 
generate a smaller share of annual pension revenues, and consequently implies an even 
smaller share of the present value of total accumulated assets. A similar principle 
applies to the liability side from changes in the level of retirement benefits. This is 
because current liabilities at market value are comprised mostly of retirement benefit 
payouts to current retirees in current year t. From an actuarial perspective, when the 
full stream of accrued benefits from both active employees and future retirees are 
considered for t-n and t+n periods, the value contributed by a single year of benefit 
payouts to the total value of actuarial liabilities is substantially less. 
Although not the focus of my study, the sGMM coefficient results for the plan level 
variables still have important funding implications for state DB retirement systems. For 
example, consider the 1-year investment rate of return variable historicalret, and the 
ratio of active to retired members variable actret. Unlike the FE coefficient results, the 
sGMM estimates for both variables show the expected positive relationship with stock 
funding ratio. The result for historicalret unremarkably confirms the importance of 
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investment returns in determining state DB plan funding levels, but the size of the 
estimated coefficient does raise some interest. The sGMM coefficient results indicate 
that a 1-percentage point increase in the 1-year rate of return on investments is 
associated with a 0.509 percentage point increase in a plan’s stock funding ratio. The 
magnitude of estimated relationship is notable since for most public pension plans, a 
percentage point increase in historicalret represents a substantial amount of additional 
revenues. At the same time, the coefficient result may just reflect the moderating effect 
from the prevalent actuarial valuation method of smoothing out investment returns  
Just as consequential is the statistically significant positive relationship between 
actret and stock. I noted earlier how the ratio of active to retired members for my panel 
of state DB plans decreased continuously every year between FY 2002 and FY 2010 from 
3.52 down to 1.98. This trend reflects the increasing number of retiring state and local 
government employees and an aging workforce in general. When re-stated, the trend 
points towards an increasing proportion of retired to active plan member employees, 
one that will pose major funding concerns for state governments. States face increasing 
retirement system funding pressure in two areas every year moving forward: dwindling 
percentage share of revenues coming from active plan member contributions, and 
annual increases in total pension annuities that state governments by law are required 
to pay no matter what.  
Despite carrying the expected sign, the assumedret variable falls short of statistical 
significance under both the FE and sGMM models. The non-significant results fail to 
provide empirical support to the suggestion drawn from past studies like Eaton and 
Nofsinger (2004) that states manipulate actuarial assumptions to record favorable 
funding outcomes. Even if the assertion is tied in with political and fiscal factors, a 
review of the CAFRs and actuarial reports of the plans in my sample showed very few 
instances when plans instituted a discount rate change during the 9 year period covered 
by my panel. I noted earlier how this is reflected in the very small panel within-group 
variation of the assumedret variable. Nonetheless, because the assumed rate of return 
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is the key assumption that drives the actuarial valuation of plan assets, this issue will 
remain a major focal point in the debate over public pension plan funding.  
In controlling for plan size in terms of plan net assets (ln_netasset), the estimated 
coefficients were significant in both the FE and sGMM model but the difference in the 
coefficient size is immediately apparent. The dramatically smaller sGMM estimate 
suggest that the actual effect on current stock funding from changes in current net asset 
holdings may be inflated in the FE model due to omitted dynamics. Interestingly, the 
same changes in coefficient size is noted between the static and dynamic FE and OLS 
models, where the ln_netasset coefficient is much smaller in the dynamic specification 
(see Appendix C). Setting aside the bias and inconsistency of the dynamic OLS and FE 
specifications, the similar changes observed for ln_netasset when it is specified under 
the dynamic version of all three estimators lend evidence to the importance 
incorporating past funding outcomes in any pension funding empirical model.  
Finally, the coefficient for my unreserved general fund balance variable gfbal_urpc1k 
was not significant in either the FE or sGMM model. When considered across all model 
specifications, the results are consistent with my analytical framework that showed 
annual state fiscal indicators would be more directly associated with employer 
contribution behavior than with overall plan funding. Virtually all empirical public 
pension studies have incorporated some type or variation of a fiscal indicator in their 
analysis. Overall though, the results are mixed, with no general consensus over which 
fiscal indicator best determines flow funding. 
Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter, I extended my static framework of analyzing public pension funding 
by specifying a dynamic panel regression model of DB state plan stock funding ratios. I 
was interested in determining the effect on the overall funded status of state DB plans 
from changes in my reform-linked funding components as they relate to employer and 
employee contributions and average retirement benefits.  I demonstrated the use a 
GMM estimator to control for potential endogeneity issues ignored in past empirical 
 
 
91 
 
studies, particularly unobserved plan heterogeneity, simultaneity, and endogeneity with 
respect to dynamic adjustments in the pension funding process. My system GMM model 
considered the endogeneity of stock and flow funding and utilized lagged values to 
instrument these variables. I discussed the results from my dynamic model and 
compared them to those obtained from my fixed effects stock funding ratio model. 
The highly significant coefficient of the stock funding lagged dependent variable 
point to the importance of past funding outcomes in determining current overall 
funding levels. The significant positive relationship between employer contribution rate 
and stock funding ratio is robust to both static and dynamic model specifications. The 
result confirms the fiduciary role of state governments, as demonstrated in their 
employer contributions, in ensuring the solvency of their respective DB retirement 
systems. Otherwise stated, what matters most in the end is how much the state 
government actually contributes into its respective DB plans. 
The member contribution rate and average benefit variable were not significant in 
both the FE and sGMM model, essentially reflecting the nature of this two variables and 
the way they are incorporated into the actuarial valuation process. From a policy 
standpoint, the results imply the limited effectiveness of increasing employee 
contribution rates and reducing the annual cost of pension annuities to improve overall 
plan funding levels. 
The sGMM model also indicated the positive effect of investment performance and 
active to retired plan membership ratio on stock funding ratio. The results shed insight 
into incorporating dynamics in modeling public pension funding in view of the actuarial 
practice of smoothing out investment returns and an aging public employee workforce. 
Finally, it should be noted that the system GMM estimator is not a panacea for all 
dynamic endogeneity related panel data issues. Indeed, Roodman’s (2009b) warns 
about the automated sophistication in the way researchers might utilize the system 
GMM estimator. While the system GMM estimator offered an appealing solution to the 
problems I faced in estimating a dynamic model of public pension funding, including, 
“the combination of a short panel, a dynamic dependent variable, fixed effects, and a 
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lack of good external instruments” (Roodman, 2009b, p. 256), it also comes with serious 
limitations. To help reduce the likelihood of invalid results being generated, Roodman 
(2009a, 2009b) stressed that researchers need to consider carefully the way they specify 
the instruments used for their regressions and for transparency, report all results from 
the relevant model diagnostic tests. 
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CHAPTER 7  
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RESEARCH PROSPECTS 
Dissertation Summary 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an empirical evaluation of Defined 
Benefit (DB) state retirement system funding. As indicated in Chapter 1, DB state 
pension plans play a major role in the country’s labor and financial markets. The 
motivation for this study conveys the widespread concern over these critically 
underfunded retirement systems, and state efforts to reform various funding aspects of 
their respective DB pension plans. A review of annual state pension related legislation 
reveals a growing impetus for reform in recent years, among an increasing number of 
states, to address the pension underfunding issue. Reforms fall under five broad 
categories identified by the Pew Center on the States (2010b), and they are: (1) keeping 
up with funding requirements; (2) increasing employee contributions; (3) reducing 
benefits; (4) improving governance and investment oversight; and (5) sharing the risk 
with employees. The saliency of the reforms is reflected in the fiduciary role of states in 
ensuring adequate funding for their respective DB plans. By design, the state 
government fulfills this role by covering any pension funding shortfalls through 
employer contributions. This raises the question of what determines the actual 
employer contribution rates, particularly as it relates to meeting annual required 
contributions. Is there empirical support for the hypothesis that state DB pension plan 
sponsors underfunded their contributions? The other research question in this study 
deals with determining an analytical link between each reform category and a specific 
DB plan funding component. Is there empirical support for the hypothesis that improved 
funding outcomes from reforms can be linked to increasing employer and employee 
contributions and reducing benefits? 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the rationale behind the various reforms and provide recent 
examples from each pension reform category. The importance of investment income in 
determining overall plan funding levels is a likely reason why much of the related 
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research has focused on examining investment performance and overall funding as a 
function of governance practices and state fiscal condition. I noted the major constraints 
of directly examining the impact of specific individual reform on a plan’s funded status. 
As an alternative, a framework was proposed to evaluate the funding impact from each 
reform category by linking it analytically to a specific DB plan funding component. 
This framework is presented in Chapter 3 using a balance-sheet approach to 
describe the DB plan funding structure and process. The asset-liability framework 
incorporates the various DB pension plan funding concepts and key measures in relating 
each pension reform category to a specific DB plan funding component. I paid particular 
attention to the funding outcomes affected by reform categories related to reducing the 
cost of retirement benefits, increasing employee contributions, and meeting annual 
employer funding requirements. There were four plan funding outcomes of interest in 
this study, namely, the employer contribution rate (ac_acp); flow funding ratio (flow); 
stock funding ratio (stock); and the unfunded actuarial accrued liability as a percentage 
of a plan’s annual covered payroll (uaal_acp). I illustrated an example where my 
framework could be used to model the impact of employer contributions on the overall 
funded status of a DB plan.  
In Chapter 4, I outlined and described the empirical modeling of DB state pension 
funding, and the estimation strategy for examining employer contribution behavior and 
the relationship between improved funding outcomes from changes in the reform-
linked DB plan funding components. Using a panel of 100 state administered DB pension 
plans from 50 states over a nine-year period FY 2002-2010, I empirically tested the 
following hypotheses using fixed effects (FE) panel regression models:  
(1) The hypothesis that states are underfunding their respective DB state plans as 
indicated by their response (AC) to the annual funding requirement (ARC).  
(2) The hypothesis that increasing employer and employee contributions and 
lowering benefit payments are associated with higher plan funding ratios and 
lower plan unfunded liabilities. 
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I presented and discussed my results in Chapter 5 in two parts. In the first part, I 
analyzed the determinants of employer contribution rates (Model 1) and flow funding 
ratios (Model 2). I found strong evidence that state DB pension plan sponsors underfund 
their annual required employer contributions. Specifically, the results from my empirical 
analysis indicate that a percentage point increase in the annual required contribution 
rate is associated with only 0.530 percentage point increase in the actual employer 
contribution rate. The results in both my employer contribution rate model (Model 1) 
and flow funding ratio model (Model 2) also suggest a significant positive relationship 
between state fiscal condition and the ability of states to make its employer 
contributions. 
The results from my stock funding ratio model (Model 3) and unfunded liability 
model (Model 4) formed the second part of my empirical analysis. When considering 
pension reforms related to changes in employer and employee contributions, my results 
provide empirical support for the critical relationship between employer contributions 
and favorable plan funding outcomes. Specifically, increasing the employer contribution 
rate and making full ARC payments significantly increase plan stock funding ratio and 
lower the relative size of the unfunded liabilities. On the other hand, I find no significant 
influence from the employee contribution rate (memcon_acp) on any of the plan 
funding outcomes. I also found no evidence that changes in the average benefit variable 
(lnaveben) had any significant effect on either the stock funding ratio (stock) variable or 
the unfunded liability variable (uaal_acp). The non-significant results for memcon_acp 
and lnaveben are attributed to the statutory environment and legal constraints that 
largely limit member contribution rate increases and benefit reductions to new 
employees. Subsequently, the overall impact on improving public plan funding 
outcomes from such policy reform efforts is expected to be minimal.   
At the end of Chapter 5, I discussed the limitations of using a static analytical 
framework for evaluating public pension funding given the inherently dynamic nature of 
the DB funding process.  Specifically, I highlighted the endogenous funding relationship 
between employer contribution behavior and the overall actuarial funded status as 
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measured by the stock funding ratio. Traditional fixed effects may ameliorate our 
control of endogeneity arising from unobserved plan heterogeneity, but it is not an 
appropriate estimator in the presence of dynamic endogeneity. To this point, Yang and 
Mitchell (2005) were the only researchers to consider the dynamic and endogenous 
components of public pension funding. However, their attempt to estimate a dynamic 
model of stock funding ratio using simple pooled OLS raises potential econometric 
concerns that are noted as well in Chapter 5.  
The need for an appropriate estimation strategy in evaluating a dynamic model of 
public pension funding becomes apparent when we consider the endogenous funding 
relationship between stock and flow funding. Such an estimation strategy is proposed in 
Chapter 6, where I presented a dynamic model for analyzing state DB plan stock funding 
ratios. Specifically, the GMM estimator, as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), 
offered a dynamic panel solution to the problems of endogeneity stemming from 
simultaneity bias, reverse causality, and omitted variables. This system GMM estimation 
strategy utilizes the lagged differences of the endogenous variables (i.e. stock and flow) 
as instruments in the level equation, and the lagged levels of the endogenous variables 
in the first-differenced equation, resulting in a stacked system of equations that includes 
equations in both levels and differences. For inference purposes, I used the estimated 
coefficients from the two-step system GMM (sGMM) with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-
sample correction to the robust standard errors. Specification tests were run to ensure 
that statistical validity of the instruments used for the endogenous stock and flow 
funding related variables. The sGMM results were also discussed in relation to the FE 
results of my stock funding ratio model from Chapter 5 (Model 3). 
There were four notable results to mention from the analysis in Chapter 6. The first 
relates to the highly significant relationship between past and current funding 
outcomes. This would suggest a concern for omitted dynamics in any static model 
specification of stock funding ratios. Second, the significant positive relationship 
between employer contribution rate and stock funding ratio was robust to both static 
and dynamic model specifications. The result confirms the fiduciary role of state 
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governments, as demonstrated in their employer contributions, in ensuring the solvency 
of their respective DB retirement systems. Third, the sGMM results continue to call into 
question the effectiveness in improving funding outcomes by implementing reforms 
related to increasing employee contribution rates and/or reducing the total cost of 
annual retirement benefit payouts. Lastly, the sGMM estimates indicated the positive 
effect of investment performance and active to retired plan membership ratio on stock 
funding ratio. The results point to the value of incorporating dynamics in modeling 
public pension funding. This is especially important as we find evidence that overall plan 
funding levels are affected by the aging public employee workforce and the actuarial 
practice of smoothing out investment returns as a means of reducing employer 
contribution rate volatility. 
Conclusion and Implications for Policy and Future Research 
In summary, the results of my empirical analysis suggest that increasing a state DB 
plan’s stock funding ratio or reducing its unfunded liabilities centers around the plan 
sponsor’s ability to increase employer contributions and making full ARC payments. 
These findings have budgetary implications for state governments attempting to reform 
their seriously underfunded DB retirement systems.  This is because the guaranteed 
nature of these retirement benefits means that state governments are ultimately 
responsible for covering any funding shortfall (Forman 2009; Young 2006).  
Questions are being raised though over the ability of states to cover shortfalls and 
sustain the solvency of their retirement systems through increased employer 
contributions in view of current and long-term fiscal challenges.  The U.S. Government 
Accountability Office projects that state and local governments will incur operating 
deficits of up to $163 billion from 2010 to 2011 (GAO 2010).  Therefore, any state effort 
to raise their DB plan employer contribution rates will greatly be constrained by the 
ongoing economic downturn in which declining state and local revenues are 
accompanied by increasing demand for public services. As Peng (2004) concisely puts it, 
“Because pension contributions come out of the general fund, they directly compete 
with other government programs for the limited resources in the general fund. Pension 
 
 
98 
 
contributions, however, do not have the same immediacy and urgency as other 
government programs” (p. 62).  
The problem is that although the state government can defer from fulfilling its 
pension funding requirements, it cannot do the same with its annual benefit payments 
to its current retirees. Widely publicized examples of how annual retiree benefit 
payments are adding to the fiscal pressures faced by governments in states like 
California, Illinois, and New York would imply that currently due retirement obligations 
seemingly trump “other government programs” in the General Fund (e.g., Crane, 2010; 
Walsh & Schoenfeld, 2010; Lowry, 2010). Just as daunting if not questionably feasible, is 
the option of pursuing reductions in the current level of retirement benefits accruing to 
active employee members, thereby lowering the average benefit payments due in 
future periods. This is why the majority of policy reforms undertaken to reduce 
retirement benefits are limited to new and future employees and essentially serve to 
lessen the rate of increase in unfunded liabilities. 
Unless the economy and financial condition of states improve and effective pension 
reforms can be instituted, severely underfunded retirement systems will only increase 
the costs of paying out these retirement benefits with every year that passes.  That cost 
eventually coming in the form of resources reallocated away from important programs 
such as education, health, and public safety. 
Study Limitations and Future Research 
The empirical analysis in this study was limited to examining the effect on our 
funding outcomes from contributions and benefit payments. Nonetheless, the 
estimated coefficients for some of the control variables in my econometric models raise 
some interesting results that warrant further investigation.  
The first relates to the effect that state fiscal conditions may have on pension plan 
funding.  The extant empirical literature strongly supports a positive relationship 
between higher stock and flow funding levels and favorable state fiscal condition. In my 
analysis, I used as my fiscal indicator, the per capita unreserved General Fund balance, 
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expressed in $1000s (gfbal_urpc1k), to represent the link described by Peng (2008) 
between the state’s general fund and its pension contribution activities. 
My results indicate a significant association between gfbal_urpc1k and ac_acp and 
flow but not with stock. If we consider Peng’s (2008) Fiscal Stress Hypothesis of public 
pension funding (i.e., in times of fiscal stress, states contribute less), there is a stronger 
theoretical argument to be made in linking state fiscal condition with flow funding 
related outcomes than with the stock values that account for long-term plan solvency. 
This is why I find the significant positive relationship between gfbal_urpc1k and 
uaal_acp, to be unexpected given the inverse relationship of uaal_acp with ac_acp and 
flow on uaal_acp (i.e., higher employer contributions should reduce the unfunded 
liability ceteris paribus). Additional research using a whole range of fiscal and economic 
variables should help provide a more definitive picture of state fiscal influence on plan 
funding levels. 
The empirical approach utilized in this study can also be expanded to include the 
dynamic modeling of DB public plan investment performance. Unlike the FE model, the 
estimated coefficients for my historicalret variable (along with the actret variable) 
yielded the expected coefficient signs under the system GMM model. Not surprisingly, 
the result essentially confirms the established link between investment returns and 
pension plan funding. Public pension plans are major players in the capital markets, and 
accordingly their asset allocation decisions and investment portfolio performance are 
constantly and extensively monitored and analyzed. In comparison, very few studies 
have used longitudinal data to examine how governance determines investment 
performance. Three of those studies, Albrecht and Lynch (2007), Doyle (2005), and Yang 
and Mitchell (2005) used pooled cross section data from the 1990s to show how a whole 
range of governance variables – from board composition, management practices, 
reporting practices, to investment practices - were significantly related to the 
investment performance of public pension plans.35 However, empirical analyses that 
                                                     
35 As mentioned throughout Chapter 4, all three studies used the same set of PENDAT survey 
files described in page 44.  
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properly account for the endogeneity of these governance variables are still lacking in 
the literature. Future research in this area can yield new insights into the relationship 
between governance and public pension funding. 
As it relates to the fourth and fifth Pew Center identified pension reform categories 
that address investment performance and investment risk, a follow-up analysis using a 
GMM framework similar to the one I used for plan stock funding ratios may shed 
additional insights into the dynamic and endogenous relationship between governance 
and investment performance. With a more recent panel dataset, we can explore how 
governance has affected investment performance in the past decade, as well as 
evaluate the potential impact of efforts to professionalize the investment oversight and 
management of public pension funds. 
Other Post-Employment Benefits (OPEBs) 
Lastly, one important area where empirical research on public pension funding is still 
lacking is the evaluation of state efforts to reform Other Post-Employment Benefits 
(OPEBs). On top of having to guarantee their sizeable regular pension obligations, states 
are facing added fiscal pressure in trying to find ways to fund OPEBs. These benefits 
were historically financed on a Pay-as-You-Go (PAYGO) basis but after GASB 43/45 were 
issued in 2004, states are now required to account for their OPEB costs and funding on 
an accrual basis using similar actuarial methods and reporting standards used in valuing 
their regular DB pension plans (Kearney et al., 2009). By complying with GASB 43/45, 
states are disclosing a more complete picture of the true cost of financing their 
respective OPEBs. The picture is a grim one if we consider recent Pew Center (2012) 
estimates of the total unfunded OPEB liability at around $627 billion, apart from the 
estimated $757 billion in unfunded regular pension benefits, within the context of a 
poor economic climate, workforce demographic trends, and escalating healthcare costs 
(GAO, 2012a,2012b).  
Depending on the magnitude of their OPEB liability, the implication of the annual 
required contribution under GASB 45 is that state governments will now have to 
contribute significantly more per year to finance other post-employment benefits 
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compared to what they would have paid on an annual PAYGO basis. GASB 45 does not 
require states to set up the kind of irrevocable trust funds used for their defined benefit 
pension plans, it does contain incentives for states to pre-fund their OPEB liabilities. This 
includes the use of a higher discount rate to value their OPEB obligations, consequently 
reducing the size of their annual required contributions. We see some evidence of states 
responding to this incentive as OPEB trust funds were set-up in 13 states in 2007 alone 
(see Table 3). Applying the same framework of finite operating budget resources to 
state OPEB funding, this raises questions about the potential budget trade-offs between 
state contributions into DB pension plans vs. OPEB trust funds and current payments of 
regular pension benefits and OPEBs to current retirees.  
There is growing anecdotal evidence that a combined trend of fiscal pressures 
caused by employer contributions to pre-fund OPEB and regular pension trust funds 
along with substantial annual OPEB and regular pension payments to current retirees 
will have an adverse impact on the financial condition of state budgets. This raises 
potential endogeneity issues that future research can address.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Cezar Brian Mamaril 2013
 
 
102 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Complete Results for OLS and Fixed Effects Specification of Employer 
Contribution Rate and Flow Funding Ratio 
  Model 1: Employer 
Contribution Rate (%ACP) 
  
Model 2: Flow Funding % 
(AC/ARC) 
  OLS Fixed Effects   OLS Fixed Effects 
ln Plan Net Assets -0.672 ** 6.880 **  -3.518 ** 31.135 ** 
(0.322)  (3.035)   (1.532)  (15.363)  
Member contributions -0.245 ** -0.092   -0.470  -0.535  
(0.108)  (0.101)   (0.478)  (0.637)  
ln average benefit  1.720 ** -0.854   8.181 ** 9.151  
(0.831)  (0.609)   (4.025)  (7.050)  
Actives/Beneficiaries  -0.033  0.037   -1.057 *** -0.529 ** 
(0.023)  (0.035)   (0.146)  (0.230)  
1 yr ROR (%) -0.020  -0.035 *  -0.253 ** -0.302 ** 
(0.019)  (0.018)   (0.104)  (0.125)  
Discount rate -3.109 ** -1.511   -14.294 ** 0.889  
(1.539)  (1.027)   (5.813)  (6.268)  
Stock Funding (%) -0.158 *** 0.039   -0.032  0.367  
(0.053)  (0.051)   (0.124)  (0.236)  
ARC (% ACP) 0.395 ** 0.530 ***  -0.758 *** 0.077  
(0.154)  (0.123)   (0.189)  (0.334)  
percap unres GenFund 
balance ($1000s) 
0.163 *** 0.281 ***  0.646  1.028 *** 
(0.059)  (0.030)   (0.406)  (0.224)  
Set of year dummy variables 
yr 2002 1.415  0.258   11.606 ** 14.835 ** 
 (1.158)  (1.070)   (4.797)  (6.746)  
yr 2003 0.722  0.408   9.970 * 13.992 * 
 (0.986)  (1.040)   (5.309)  (7.686)  
yr 2004 0.987  0.297   7.014  7.449  
 (0.961)  (0.872)   (4.297)  (4.952)  
yr 2005 0.335  -0.695   1.958  -0.707  
 (0.766)  (0.472)   (3.969)  (3.161)  
yr 2006 0.967  -0.724   4.349  -1.846  
 (1.064)  (0.613)   (4.452)  (3.175)  
yr 2007 2.789  -0.091   9.555  -1.915  
 (1.966)  (1.071)   (5.718)  (4.120)  
yr 2008 1.691 ** -0.316   7.497 * -1.304  
 (0.735)  (0.812)   (4.351)  (5.043)  
yr 2009 .  0.430   .  -0.737  
 .  (0.416)   .  (3.164)  
yr 2010 -0.364  .   2.940  .  
  (0.373)   .     (3.042)   .   
Constant 37.96 * -90.03 *  193.92 ** -540.13 ** 
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  (18.99)   (49.04)     (75.55)   (266.9)   
Observations (n) 898  898   898  898  
R2 0.419     0.118    
rho   0.742     0.750  
R2  within group   0.247     0.078  
R2  between group   0.017     0.003  
R2  overall group   0.044     0.000  
F- test of joint 
significance 58.606  335.942   33.625  60.063  
Note: AC-Actual employer Contribution ($1000s); ARC-annual required contribution ($1000s); ACP-
Annual Covered Payroll ($1000s); Note: AC-Actual employer Contribution ($1000s); ARC-annual 
required contribution ($1000s); ACP-Annual Covered Payroll ($1000s); percap unres GenFund balance 
($1000s) - is the unreserved general fund balance scaled by the state's population & expressed in 
thousand dollars. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in the brackets 
below the coefficient results; "rho" is the share of the estimated variance of the overall error 
accounted for by the individual plan effect. All panel regression models include year dummies whose 
estimated coefficients are not reported in this table but can be found in Appendix A. 
Appendix B. Complete Results for OLS and Fixed Effects Specification of Stock Funding 
and UAAL 
  Model 3: Stock Funding 
(AVA/AAL) % 
  
Model 4: Unfunded Actuarial 
Accrued Liabilities (%ACP) 
  OLS Fixed Effects   OLS Fixed Effects 
ln Plan Net Assets 2.764 ** 25.906 ***  5.726  -30.782  
(1.288)  (7.344)   (7.536)  (33.408)  
Member contributions -1.045 *** -0.681   2.252  -3.320  
(0.366)  (0.494)   (2.027)  (4.073)  
ln average benefit  -1.702  4.012   -17.440  21.195  
(3.200)  (3.161)   (26.191)  (17.646)  
1-yr ROR (%) 0.055  -0.083 **  -1.183 ** -0.917 * 
(0.040)  (0.033)   (0.519)  (0.477)  
Discount rate -4.195  6.941   9.538  -10.338  
(3.673)  (4.220)   (6.823)  (14.852)  
Actives/Beneficiaries  0.608 *** -0.321 ***  -0.173  -1.406 *** 
(0.129)  (0.099)   (0.239)  (0.467)  
Employer contributions -0.714 *** 0.041 *  0.020  -1.203 *** 
(0.159)  (0.023)   (0.849)  (0.125)  
Made ARC dummy 7.132 *** 1.466 *  -9.980  0.110  
(1.860)  (0.751)   (8.093)  (3.786)  
percap unres GenFund 
balance ($1000s) 
-0.086  -0.021   2.188 *** 2.700 *** 
(0.233)  (0.060)   (0.745)  (0.509)  
Set of year dummy variables                 
yr 2002 8.825 *** 17.07 ***  .  .  
 (2.158)  (2.865)   .  .  
yr 2003 5.396 ** 13.126 ***  16.148  16.411  
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 (2.033)  (2.988)   (12.919)  (19.853)  
yr 2004 3.789 * 8.187 ***  19.873  22.899  
 (2.075)  (2.350)   (20.466)  (22.417)  
yr 2005 2.251  3.745 **  -2.234  2.813  
 (1.796)  (1.630)   (9.169)  (4.840)  
yr 2006 3.378 * 1.684 *  -9.139  -0.372  
 (1.742)  (0.921)   (9.378)  (4.689)  
yr 2007 5.472 *** .   -11.873  .  
 (1.867)  .   (10.927)  .  
yr 2008 3.733 *** -2.713 ***  -24.768 ** -12.319  
 (0.940)  (0.639)   (11.444)  (14.414)  
yr 2009 .  -3.121 **  .  5.936  
 .  (1.441)   .  (10.550)  
yr 2010 -2.626 ** -5.057 ***  6.665  9.261  
  (1.172)   (1.503)     (10.100)   (7.943)   
Constant 91.82 *** -432.50 ***  12.803  419.85  
  (32.13)   (132.3)     (82.87)   (565.3)   
R2 0.445     0.063    
rho   0.973     0.381  
R2  within group   0.571     0.071  
R2  between group   0.041     0.039  
R2  overall group   0.057     0.001  
F- test of joint 
significance 
44.076 
 
184.867 
 
 52.407 
 
82.590 
 
Note: AC-Actual employer Contribution ($1000s); ARC-annual required contribution ($1000s); ACP-
Annual Covered Payroll ($1000s); percap unres GenFund balance ($1000s) - is the unreserved general 
fund balance scaled by the state's population & expressed in thousand dollars. Model 4 dependent 
variable is first-differenced to eliminate the unit-root. Robust standard errors clustered at the state 
level are reported in the brackets below the coefficient results; "rho" is the share of the estimated 
variance of the overall error accounted for by the individual plan effect. All panel regression models 
include year dummies whose estimated coefficients are not reported in this table but can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Appendix C. Complete Results for System GMM specification of Stock Funding 
Depvar: Stock Funding ols (n=896) fe (n=896) sgmm (n=896) 
Stock Fundingt-1 0.939 *** 0.591 *** 0.732 *** 
(0.021)  (0.055)  (0.069)  
ln Plan Net Assets 0.397  13.323 *** 2.335 * 
(0.249)  (4.117)  (1.202)  
Member Contributions (% ACP) -0.112  -0.190  -0.561  
(0.069)  (0.208)  (0.452)  
ln average plan benefit payments -0.611  1.187  -3.870  
(0.558)  (1.444)  (3.944)  
1 yr ROR on investments (%) 0.117 ** 0.022  0.509 *** 
(0.051)  (0.037)  (0.151)  
Assumed rate of return (%) -1.246 *** 1.788  1.340  
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(0.423)  (1.568)  (3.106)  
Actives/Beneficiaries Ratio 0.169 *** -0.067  1.645 ** 
(0.022)  (0.040)  (0.673)  
Employer Contributions (% ACP) 0.084 *** 0.116 *** 0.075 ** 
(0.017)  (0.025)  (0.035)  
made ARC dummy 0.199  0.044  1.745  
(0.332)  (0.466)  (1.086)  
percap unres GenFund balance 
($1000s) 
-0.079 ** -0.031  -0.172  
(0.036)  (0.032)  (0.346)  
Set of year dummy variables             
 yr 2002 -3.776 *** 8.986 *** 7.365 ** 
  (1.133)  (1.827)  (3.341)  
 yr 2003 -3.911 *** 7.494 *** 2.132  
  (0.848)  (1.648)  (1.987)  
 yr 2004 -3.401 *** 5.594 *** -1.013  
  (0.711)  (1.236)  (1.257)  
 yr 2005 -2.52 *** 4.107 *** 1.587  
  (0.541)  (0.798)  (1.194)  
 yr 2006 -0.916 * 3.953 *** 2.731 *** 
  (0.508)  (0.784)  (0.878)  
 yr 2007 .  3.486 *** 1.703 * 
  .  (0.930)  (0.887)  
 yr 2008 -1.233  1.560  10.489 *** 
  (1.220)  (1.065)  (2.962)  
 yr 2009 -3.284 * 0.641  10.995 ** 
  (1.721)  (1.196)  (4.450)  
 yr 2010 -3.364 *** .    
  (0.714)  .    
Constant 13.311 ** -213.908 *** 0.133   
  (5.910)  (67.319)  (25.484)  
R2 0.929           
rho   0.940    
r2_w   0.755    
r2_b   0.380    
r2_o   0.417    
F- test of joint significance F(18,49)=3185.93 F(18,49)=791.94 F(18,99)=67.98 
    Pr>F=0.001 Pr>F=0.001 Pr>F=0.001 
System GMM Model Diagnostics (Stock Funding) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences z = -3.31 
 Ho: No first-order serial correlation in residuals Pr > z = 0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences z = 0.51 
 Ho: No second-order serial correlation in residuals Pr > z = 0.543 
Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions chi2 (92) = 89.90 
 Ho: Specified model and all overidentified instruments are valid (i.e. exogenous) Pr > chi2 = 0.543 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
 Hansen test excluding system-GMM instruments for levels chi2 (68) = 81.12 
 Ho: GMM differenced- instruments are exogenous Pr > chi2 = 0.132 
 Exogeneity of GMM instruments for levels chi2 (24) = 8.77 
 Ho: system-GMM instruments are exogenous and increases Hansen J-
test 
Pr > chi2 = 0.998 
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 Hansen test excluding standard “IV” instruments chi2 (84) = 89.60 
 Ho: GMM instruments without ”IV” instruments are exogenous Pr > chi2 = 0.318 
 Exogeneity of standard “IV” instruments chi2 (8) = 0.30 
 Ho: Standard “IV” instruments are exogenous and increases Hansen J-
test 
Pr > chi2 = 0.999 
Details on Instruments used in System GMM Model of Stock Funding 
EQUATION / Instrument Type IV GMM 
First Differences Equation Diff. (year 
dummies) 
Lag (1-4). stock ac_acp 
made_arc 
Levels Equation year dummies Diff. (stock ac_acp made_arc) 
Number of instruments 111 
Appendix E. Technical Overview: Implementing System GMM in Stata and Comments 
on Model Diagnostic Tests 
In this section, I discuss in more detail how I implemented dynamic GMM estimation 
in Stata (Version 12.1) using Roodman’s (2009) user written command xtabond2. I also 
comment on the statistical diagnostic tests used to assess the appropriateness and 
validity of my system GMM pension funding stock funding ratio model. 
Implementing System GMM in Stata 
Using the user written command xtabond2, I obtained the system GMM results, as 
reported in Table 6-1, using the following code in Stata: 
xtabond2 stock lagstock ln_netasset memcon_acp lnaveben 
historicalret actret ac_acp made_arc gfbal_urpc1k y02 y03 
y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10, gmm(stock ac_acp made_arc, 
lag(1 4)) iv(y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10) twostep 
robust small  
As specified in eq.6-4, the lagged dependent variable `lagstock’ is included as an 
explanatory variable. The `gmm’ option invokes our lagged instrument set. In this case, 
the command incorporates the assumption that the stock funding ratio, employer 
contribution rate, and “made 100% ARC payment” dummy variable are endogenous (i.e. 
`gmm style’ instruments) , and “( lag(1 4)” invokes instruments from lag periods t-1 up 
to t-4 respectively. All the year dummies are assumed to be strictly exogenous, hence 
the `iv style’ command option. 
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Comments on Model Diagnostics 
The xtabond2 command also reports the results of several diagnostic tests used to 
check the validity of the GMM model and instruments used.  My discussion draws from 
the approach outlined by Efendic et al. (2010). When considered altogether, the results 
provide empirical verification on the appropriateness of my system GMM model 
specifications and the validity of the instruments used. 
F-test of Joint Significance 
The first statistical test is the F-test of joint significance of independent variables 
which tests the null hypothesis that the independent variables are jointly equal to zero.  
The F-test result indicates we reject the null hypothesis that independent variables are 
jointly equal to zero at any conventional level of significance. Assuming the statistical 
validity of the model, the independent variables in the dynamic panel regression 
collectively explain variations of the dependent variable. 
First-Order and Second-Order Serial Correlations 
These serial correlation tests of the null hypothesis of no first or second order serial 
correlation are sometimes referred simply as “AR(1)” and “AR(2)” respectively. 
Assuming the validity of our specification, by construction, the residuals of GMM 
estimates in first differences should be correlated, but there should be no serial 
autocorrelation in second differences. The AR(2) test result for my sGMM model of 
stock funding confirms no second-order serial correlation. 
Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions 
The exogeneity of the instruments is a crucial assumption for the validity of GMM 
estimates. The dynamic panel GMM estimator uses multiple lags as instruments. This 
means that our system is over-identified and allows us to implement a Hansen test of 
over-identification. The Hansen J-statistic is the value of the GMM objective function 
evaluated at the efficient GMM estimator ?̂?𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀 (Baum, 2006). Under the null that that 
moment conditions are valid: 
𝐽(?̂?𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀) = 𝑁?̅?(?̂?𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀)′?̂?
−1?̅?(?̂?𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀) ∼ 𝒳𝑙−𝑘
2  
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where the matrix ?̂? is estimated using the two-step method. The J statistic is 
asymptotically distributed as 2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
overidentifying restrictions L-k rather than the total number of moment conditions (L). 
Essentially, k degrees of freedom are spent in estimating the coefficients ẞ (Baum, 
2006; p. 201). For my system GMM model, the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions fails to reject the null at any conventional level of significance. This lends 
evidence that the instruments used in my specification are valid. 
The difference-in-Hansen test for GMM instruments and standard IV instruments 
While the Hansen test for overidentification evaluates the entire set of 
overidentifying restrictions, the “difference-in-Hansen” or “C statistic” tests the validity 
of a subset of instruments. The statistic is computed as the difference between two 
Hansen statistics (Baum et al., 2003): that for the (restricted, fully efficient) regression 
using the entire set of overidentifying restrictions, versus that for the (unrestricted, 
inefficient but consistent) regression using a smaller set of restrictions, in which a 
specified set of instruments are removed from the set.  
For excluded instruments, this is equivalent to dropping them from the instrument 
list, and for included instruments, treating them as endogenous regressors by placing 
them in the list of included endogenous regressors. The C test, distributed 𝓧𝟐 with 
degrees of freedom equal to the loss of overidentifying restrictions (i.e. number of 
instruments in the subset being tested), has the null hypothesis that the examined 
instruments are exogenous, and thus, proper instruments (Baum et al. 2003).  
Results from all the difference-in-Hansen tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of any GMM instruments and the validity of standard IV instruments. 
Cross section dependence 
The validity of GMM estimators also rest on the assumption that disturbances are 
cross-sectionally independent.  While cross-sectional dependence is often encountered 
in macroeconomic and financial panels with long time series where failure to account 
for cross-unit dependency may lead to misleading inference, it has also been shown to 
impact short dynamic panel estimators (Baltagi, 2005; Sarafidis & Robertson, 2009).  As 
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common unobserved shocks is one source of potential heterogeneous error cross 
section dependence across pairs of cross section units (Sarafidis et al. 2009), I include 
year dummies in my system GMM model specifications as a way to remove universal 
time-related shocks from the error term. 
Sarafidis et al. (2009) proposed a two-part method for detecting cross section 
dependence in GMM panel data models with a large number of cross-sectional units (N) 
and relatively small number of time series observations (T). The test combines assessing 
results from the second order serial correlation test and a difference-in-Hansen test. 
They show how rejecting the null in the AR(2) test may be an indication of potential 
heterogeneous error cross section dependence.  Sarafidis et al. recommend in one 
applied example, that after a significant AR(2) test result, to check if the diagnostics 
from difference-in-Hansen test are worse for the dynamic panel specification after time 
dummies are excluded. According to them, this would lend evidence of cross section 
dependence. 
Following the above discussion, AR(2) tests for all my model specifications reveal no 
evidence of error serial correlation and following the diagnostic procedure put forth in 
Sarafidis et al. (2009), implies possibly no heterogeneous error cross section 
dependence as well. 
Bond’s OLS-GMM-FE estimators check 
A cursory check of estimator validity in a dynamic panel model was proposed by 
Bond (2002) who noted that the GMM estimated coefficient of the  lagged dependent 
variable should lie between that of the Fixed Effects estimates (which is biased 
downwards) and the OLS estimates (which is biased upwards).  The FE<SGMM<OLS 
lagged stock funding ratio dependent variable coefficient results (0.440<0.725<0.908) 
shows that the system GMM coefficient estimate lies between the lower bound of the 
fixed effects model and upper bound of the OLS model. Following Bond’s (2002) 
suggestion to compare FE-GMM-OLS coefficient estimates of the lagged dependent 
variable lend further support to the appropriateness of my system GMM model 
specifications.   
 
 
110 
 
The test for “steady state” assumption 
The improved efficiency as a result of the exploitation of additional moments in 
system GMM relies also on a mild mean stationarity assumption on the initial conditions 
(Blundell & Bond, 1998). According to Roodman (2009a), this means that changes in the 
instrumenting variables or deviations from long-term values are not systematically 
related to the fixed-effects.  This is the assumption that enables us to include the levels 
equations in our GMM estimates and use lagged differences as instruments for these 
levels.  In effect, Roodman points out the sampled individuals are in a “kind of steady-
state” throughout the study period. Results from an augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root 
test indicate that the stock funding variable is stationary. In an applied setting, for the 
system GMM model specification to be valid, the absolute value of the estimated 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable signifies convergence by having an absolute 
value less than unity (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2009b). The system GMM 
estimates of the lagged funding ratio dependent variable exhibit this property (0.701 < 
1). 
Identifying the choice and number of instruments 
Problems associated with dynamic short panel econometrics such as weak 
instrumentation and instrument proliferation can lead to invalid results that appear 
valid.  To address this concern, Roodman (2009b) strongly recommends reporting the 
number of instruments generated for each regression and results from all specification 
tests.  While there are no clear or standardized rules on what determines “too many” 
instruments in GMM estimation, Roodman (2009a), mentioned some “rules of thumb” 
or “telltale” signs as it relates to instrument count and validity, they include: (1) when 
the number of instruments outnumber individuals in the panel; and (2) a perfect Hansen 
J-test statistic p value of 1.00. My empirical estimation adheres to both criteria.  The 
number of instruments is less than the number of individual plans in the sample (95 < 
100 plans), and the Hansen J-test p values indicate failure to reject the null at any 
conventional level of significance (p=0.229) and they are far from a perfect p value of 1. 
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